Aligning the Budget Model to Strategic Goals
Executive-Level Decision Points to Ensure Impact on Cost, Growth, and Strategy
Aligning the Budget Model to **Strategic Goals**

Executive-Level Decision Points to Ensure Impact on Cost, Growth, and Strategy
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## Table of Contents

Supporting Members in Resource Allocation. .......................................................... 4
Executive Summary. ................................................................................................. 5
Shifting Trends in Higher Education Resource Allocation. .................................... 7
Summary of Decision Points (DPs). ................................................................. 16

### Section 1: Creating Unit-Level Financial Accountability. ................................. 19
   DP 1: Tuition revenue allocation percentage. .............................................. 22
   DP 2: Tuition revenue allocation weighting ............................................... 29
   DP 3: Enrollment smoothing. ................................................................. 33
   DP 4: Differential tuition allocation .......................................................... 38
   DP 5: State appropriation allocation ....................................................... 43
   DP 6: Overhead cost allocation .............................................................. 45
   DP 7: Monitoring unit spend. ................................................................. 54

### Section 2: Preserving Mission-Critical Activities Through Subvention and Strategic Reserves. ................................................................. 57
   DP 8: Ensuring central strategic reserves. .............................................. 59
   DP 9: Subvention methodology transparency .......................................... 63
   DP 10: Structuring effective subvention. ................................................. 67

### Section 3: Incorporating Institutional Goals into the Model ......................... 75
   DP 11: Incenting student success .......................................................... 78
   DP 12: Incenting research growth ......................................................... 84
   DP 13: Incenting targeted program launches ......................................... 90

Advisors to Our Work ................................................................. 95
Supporting Members in Resource Allocation

Related Tools, Services, and Publications Available Within Your Membership

This publication represents only one of EAB’s many resources to support members in their goals to develop more strategic resource allocation models. Detail about additional tools, services, and publications is provided below.

For additional information about any of these services—or for an electronic version of this publication—please visit our website (eab.com/baf), email your institution’s dedicated advisor, or email research@eab.com.

On-Demand Webconferences
Register for upcoming sessions to hear our latest findings or access archives of past presentations. Many members convene campus leaders and task forces to attend and share ideas on practices and implementation.

Optimizing Institutional Budget Models
Strategic Lessons for Aligning Incentives and Improving Financial Performance
This study helps colleges and universities develop more strategic resource allocation systems. It includes four executive-level lessons on budget design and a compendium of 29 budget model elements to guide business executives and their teams in strategic resource allocation model design.

Increasing Central Fungible Dollars
Executive Tactics to Secure Funding and Garner Buy-In for Strategic Priorities
This study examines eight tactics institutions can implement to increase central fungible dollars and fund and garner support for strategic priorities.

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Business Affairs Forum members may contact EAB researchers at any time to discuss our findings, request networking conversations, or review related resources and practices.

All Business Affairs Forum resources are available to members in unlimited quantity.

To order additional copies of this book, or to learn about our other services, please visit us at eab.com or contact us at 202-266-6400.
Executive Summary

Institutions Adjusting Budget Models to Reinforce Financial and Strategic Goals

Budget models remain an area of scrutiny in higher education, as scores of institutions consider either adjustments to their current model or wholesale model changes. And while some institutions are changing models in response to current financial pressures, others are proactively making changes to reorient institutional decision making and build resilience against unknown, future threats. Finance and administration leaders, in particular, view the budget model as one of the most impactful ways to align stakeholders to financial realities, automate smarter resource allocation decisions, or create a workaround for shared governance and weak strategic planning common in higher education.

Struggling to Find the Middle Ground in Model Design

In contrast to the RCM-or-bust attitude of the previous decade, many institutions are now looking to adopt hybrid models that incorporate the best elements of centralized and decentralized models. However, leaders have struggled to determine which institutional goals are best achieved through decentralized incentives versus central investment and oversight. And as there is not a uniform “one-size-fits-all” hybrid model that every institution should emulate, designing a model that aligns with an institution's strategic priorities, mission, and culture requires hundreds of individual decisions—which can quickly become overwhelming.

Targeting the Most Important Budget Model Design Decisions

Fortunately, a small handful of decisions have a disproportionate impact on model success or failure. To help business executives focus on the most impactful budget model design elements and align the model to strategic goals, this publication details 13 executive-level budget model decision points that break into three major categories. First, institutions must allocate some revenues and costs to create financial accountability for units. Second, institutions must structure and deploy strategic reserves and subvention to safeguard mission-critical activities. Finally, institutions should incorporate strategic goals into the model through a mix of decentralized incentives and centralized funding to ensure units invest in institutional priorities.

1 Create Unit-Level Financial Accountability

Allocate some revenues and costs to align unit-level operational responsibility with institution-wide financial imperatives

2 Preserve Mission-Critical Activities

Protect mission-critical but financially dependent units from harm in the new model to protect institution brand, and build central reserves for major investments

3 Incorporate Institutional Strategic Goals

Align stakeholders with strategic goals through performance funding, seed funding, and governance policies
Budget models remain an area of intense scrutiny, as scores of institutions consider either adjustments to their current model or wholesale model changes. While a host of challenges and industry shifts are driving this interest, four major pressures in particular are pushing institutions to consider changing budget models. First, incoming executive leaders often initiate budget model transitions at their new campuses, which is occurring more often as average President and Provost tenure decline. Second, some institutions have been forced to make model changes to meet stakeholder demands for greater financial transparency.

In addition to internal mandates, two industry-wide threats are further driving budget model changes. First, as higher education’s shifting business model requires resource reallocation and strategic investments to fuel growth, many institutions look to new models to create greater fund flexibility. Second, as institutions face tightening budgets, some change budget models to incent mission-focused academic leaders to make program decisions with financial impact top of mind.

Source: Business Affairs Forum interviews and analysis.
Proactively Anticipating Future Needs

Model Structure Can Address Limitations of Shared Governance

While some institutions are changing models in response to current pressures, others are proactively making model changes to reorient institutional decision making and build resilience against unknown, future threats. Finance and administration leaders, in particular, view the budget model as one of the most impactful ways to reinforce financial goals and strategic priorities. Three key aspirations business leaders have for budget model changes are detailed below.

First, the budget model can align campus stakeholders to financial realities. Rather than time-consuming town halls or educational sessions, the model can help leaders understand and buy into necessary financial tradeoffs.

Second, the budget model can automate smarter resource allocation decisions. The right budget mechanisms ensure funds naturally flow to high-growth or high-demand areas—thereby preempting politically contentious reallocation and downsizing decisions. Last, the budget model can serve as a workaround to weak strategic planning. Unlike broad and all-encompassing strategic plans common in higher education, the budget model can provide more concrete direction with funds and incentives for top institutional priorities.

Second, the budget model can automate smarter resource allocation decisions. The right budget mechanisms ensure funds naturally flow to high-growth or high-demand areas—thereby preempting politically contentious reallocation and downsizing decisions. Last, the budget model can serve as a workaround to weak strategic planning. Unlike broad and all-encompassing strategic plans common in higher education, the budget model can provide more concrete direction with funds and incentives for top institutional priorities.

Of course, changing the budget model is not a panacea that solves all institutional problems. All models require strong executive leadership and direction to be successful, as well as sufficient IT and data capabilities. Nonetheless, the budget model can create a decision-making structure for long-term success and alleviate some of the problems associated with shared governance.

Source: Business Affairs Forum interviews and analysis.
The Allure of RCM

Pace of RCM Adoption Accelerates After Recession

Across the 2000’s, most colleges and universities changing budget models implemented some form of Responsibility Center Management (RCM). While the industry was already trending toward RCM before 2008, the number of RCM institutions increased dramatically after the recession, as institutions facing flat tuition sought to create stronger incentives and quickly improve finances. By 2015, 25% of CBOs reported using an RCM-type model.

Timeline of Institutions Moving to RCM Budget Models

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>2000s</th>
<th>2014 and Beyond</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Brandeis University</td>
<td>Auburn University</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ohio State University</td>
<td>Cornell University</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Okanagan College</td>
<td>George Washington University</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>University of New Hampshire</td>
<td>Ohio University</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>University of Minnesota</td>
<td>Portland State University</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>University of Utah</td>
<td>Temple University</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Iowa State University</td>
<td>Alberta University</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kent State University</td>
<td>University of Arizona</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Marquette University</td>
<td>University of Kentucky</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rutgers University</td>
<td>University of New Mexico</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Southern Oregon University</td>
<td>University of Vermont</td>
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<tr>
<td>Syracuse University</td>
<td>University of Utah</td>
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<td>University of Toronto</td>
<td>University of Delaware</td>
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<td>University of Florida</td>
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<td></td>
<td>University of Oregon</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Wright State University</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

25% of CBOs report using RCM-type model in 2015.

Institutions Adopting RCM Accelerates After Recession

Facing significant downward pressure on tuition revenue and declining state support, many institutions adopted RCM models after the recession to create transparency, control costs, and incent units to seek revenue growth opportunities.

1) Institutions above may not have fully adopted RCM, but were cited in media or interviews as considering a shift to an RCM model at some point.
Select Institutions Moving Away from RCM

However, more recently a handful of institutions have deliberately moved away from RCM. For example, the University of Oregon is overhauling the RCM model leaders adopted after the recession, citing the model’s inability to provide sufficient central resources or incent research growth. While not completely abandoning RCM, many other institutions are intentionally watering down the decentralized elements of their models. The common theme across this emerging trend is that while RCM creates impactful incentives to grow revenue, it also reduces central control and discretionary resources.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Institution</th>
<th>RCM Lifespan</th>
<th>Reason for Model Change</th>
<th>New Model Characteristics</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>University of South Carolina</td>
<td>2003-2011</td>
<td>RCM model yielded insufficient central funding and control over resource decisions to navigate state budget cuts</td>
<td>Mostly incremental</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>University of Oregon</td>
<td>2010-2016</td>
<td>RCM model yielded insufficient central funding and control over resource decisions to advance institutional strategic goal of enhancing research profile</td>
<td>Still in development</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>University of Kentucky</td>
<td>2011-2015</td>
<td>Leadership anticipated RCM model would divert units’ focus away from strategic priorities of student success</td>
<td>Incremental with performance pot for strategic initiatives</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: University of Kentucky, Lexington, KY; University of Oregon, Eugene, OR; University of South Carolina, Columbia, SC; Business Affairs Forum interviews and analysis.
Increasing Number of Institutions Moving Toward Hybrid Models

Instead, seeking the best of both worlds, many institutions are adopting hybrid models that include elements of classic centralized and decentralized models. The primary advantage of centralized models is the availability of resources for senior leaders to invest in strategic priorities and drive the institutional vision. Conversely, decentralized models create unit-level financial accountability and automatically shift institutional resources to areas of high-growth. Given the merits of each model type, many institutions have tried to design hybrid models that capture the benefits of both while minimizing or eliminating their respective limitations.

Unfortunately, there is not a single one-size-fits-all hybrid model that every institution should emulate. Institutions have adopted widely different hybrid models, ranging from 100% activity-based tuition revenue allocation with centrally held state appropriations to primarily incremental models with an activity-based formula for new tuition revenue. Given this wide variation, the challenge for business executives is to design a model that fits the institution.
Hundreds of Decisions, but Not All Need Executive Attention

However, designing any budget model requires hundreds of individual decisions—which can quickly become overwhelming. Fortunately, a small handful of decisions have a disproportionate impact on model success or failure, and focusing energy on just this handful can generate a model that aligns with an institution’s strategic priorities, mission, and culture. These core budget model decisions, detailed in this publication, should be made by a narrow group of senior leaders, including the CBO, the Provost, the President, and the budget director.

Start Narrow for Big Decisions...

**Ideal Core Budget Model Team**

- CBO
- President
- Provost
- Budgeting Expert
- Faculty Member with Financial Expertise

...Then Go Wider to Gain Buy-In

**Ideal Budget Model Steering Committee**

- Senior Administrators
- Budget & Finance Staff
- Deans
- Business Officers
- Faculty Senate Representative
  - Financially Savviest
  - Largest School
  - Biggest Critic

Separating the Wheat from the Chaff

“We knew there were certain key things that our model had to accomplish, and we made sure they were built into the model. There were 100 other smaller decisions that honestly could go one way or another and really wouldn’t affect the outcome.”

*Ken Kaiser, CBO*
*Temple University*

After these (few) key decisions are made, the remaining (many) decisions can be largely delegated to the budget model committee or taskforce composed of campus stakeholders, including deans and faculty. This division of labor has two advantages. First, it gives the academic leaders on the budget model committee a sense of ownership over the model, creating goodwill and buy-in. To maximize buy-in, institutions should consider including the dean with the most financial expertise, the dean of the largest college, and the dean likely to be the biggest critic. Second, and more importantly, this division of labor ensures that senior leaders dictate the decisions most critical to model success.
Executive Framework

To help business executives focus on the most impactful budget model design decisions and align the model to strategic goals, this publication details 13 executive-level budget model decision points that break into three major categories. First, institutions must allocate some revenues and costs to create unit-level financial accountability. Second, institutions must build in elements of centralized models to safeguard mission-critical activities. Finally, institutions should incorporate strategic goals into the model through a mix of decentralized incentives and centralized funding and oversight to ensure units invest in institutional priorities.

For institutions considering a wholesale model change, this publication offers a decision framework to guide model design. Institutions seeking only to make targeted model improvements should review all decision points to affirm current approaches are working and then focus efforts on isolated improvement areas.

1. **Creating Unit-Level Financial Accountability**

   *Incenting Program Growth Through Revenue Allocation*

   1. What percentage of tuition revenue should we allocate through an activity-based formula?
   2. How should we weight SCH versus majors in tuition allocation?
   3. Should we use enrollment smoothing to allocate tuition revenue?
   4. Should we allocate any forms of differential tuition revenue?
   5. Should we allocate unrestricted state appropriations?

   *Driving Unit-Level Cost Containment*

   6. How do we allocate overhead costs to maximize incentives and maintain buy-in?
   7. How do we regulate unit spending to protect institution finances and strategic goals?

2. **Preserving Mission-Critical Activities Through Subvention and Strategic Reserves**

   8. How do we ensure sufficient central reserves for strategic investments?
   9. How overt or hidden should subvention be?
   10. How do we motivate units receiving subvention to still make financial improvement?

3. **Incorporating Institutional Strategic Goals into the Model**

   11. How do we incent student success goals through the budget model?
   12. How do we incent research growth through the budget model?
   13. How do we incent targeted new program launches through the budget model?

Source: Business Affairs Forum interviews and analysis.
Revenue and Cost Allocation Decision Points

A Note About Our Guidance

The following table provides a high-level summary of the Business Affairs Forum’s guidance for each of the 13 executive-level budget model decision points detailed across the remainder of this publication. EAB provides guidance for each decision point across these two pages, with the aim that business executives can use this table as a “cheat sheet” to guide budget model discussions with other senior leaders. The guidance will be one of three types:

• First, some decision points have competing options with meaningful pros and cons rather than a universal right answer.
• Second, in other cases conventional wisdom says there is no universal answer, but there is actually an approach most institutions should adopt.
• Lastly, sometimes a little-known third approach offers the best of both worlds.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Decision Point</th>
<th>EAB Guidance</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. What percentage of tuition revenue should we allocate through an activity-based formula?</td>
<td>Most institutions should allocate bulk of revenue (70% or more) via an activity-based formula to break up base budgets and create P+L incentives for units.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. How should we weight SCH versus majors in tuition allocation?</td>
<td>Most institutions utilize a split between 85/15 and 70/30, but more important for senior leaders to set range and let deans pick exact split for buy-in.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. Should we use enrollment smoothing to allocate tuition revenue?</td>
<td>Allocate tuition revenue based on prior-year enrollment or current-year projections and establish central loan pool to quickly reward growth and smooth unit budget volatility.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. Should we allocate any forms of differential tuition revenue?</td>
<td>Aside from rare exceptions, institutions should not allocate out-of-state tuition, financial aid, or weighted credit hours to avoid perverse incentives and keep units focused on right priorities.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5. Should we allocate unrestricted state appropriations?</td>
<td>Institutions can either allocate state funds along with tuition or hold centrally for subvention or strategic investments. Senior leaders must decide on which method to use early in the design process.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6. How do we allocate overhead costs to maximize incentives and maintain buy-in?</td>
<td>Institutions should aim to allocate 4-6 overhead cost pools and 1-2 drivers per pool to strike a balance between simplicity and precision.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7. How do we regulate unit spending to protect institution finances and strategic goals?</td>
<td>Institutions should integrate oversight of unit-level spending decisions with ongoing central resource planning to ensure unit alignment with institutional finances and strategic goals.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Three Types of Guidance

- Competing Options
- Recommended Right Answer
- A Third Way

1) Profit and Loss Statement.

Source: Business Affairs Forum interviews and analysis.
Emphasizing Transparency

An important theme across these 13 decision points is maintaining budget model transparency. In general, greater model transparency creates stronger and more effective incentives. This is because units are less likely to act on incentives in a low-transparency model if they cannot easily understand how their behaviors impact unit funding levels. Worse yet, academic leaders may become actively suspicious of low-transparency models, spending more time and energy trying to decipher the model than focusing on growth or cost-savings initiatives. Importantly, model transparency is not binary. Instead, transparency is incrementally increased (or decreased) by a number of disparate decisions. Discounting the importance of transparency in these decisions can quickly make the entire budget model less transparent and thus less effective. Therefore, business executives should keep transparency top-of-mind across all model design decisions.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Decision Point</th>
<th>EAB Guidance</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>8. How do we ensure sufficient central reserves for strategic investments?</td>
<td>Institutions should create a separate 3-5% tax on all revenue to fund central strategic reserves, and promise to use a portion of funds on unit priorities to win buy-in for tax.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9. How overt or hidden should subvention be?</td>
<td>Institutions should make subvention as overt as possible to avoid perverse incentives and maintain P+L transparency.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10. How do we motivate units receiving subvention to still make financial improvement?</td>
<td>Institutions should set a clear end date for units on bridge subvention and allocate subvention with strings attached for mission-critical units to continuously motivate units.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11. How do we incent student success goals through the budget model?</td>
<td>Institutions can use financial incentives and seed funding to encourage units to achieve student success goals. Institutions should monitor and correct for perverse budget model incentives that may impede student success.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12. How do we incent research growth through the budget model?</td>
<td>Institutions can use financial incentives and seed funding to encourage units to achieve research growth goals. Institutions should monitor and correct for perverse budget model incentives that may impede research growth.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13. How do we incent targeted new program launches through the budget model?</td>
<td>Institutions can use financial incentives and seed funding to encourage units to launch targeted new programs. Institutions should monitor and correct for perverse budget model incentives that may impede new program launches.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
What Else to Consider?

Tools, Policies, and Data That Complement the Budget Model Change

In addition to this publication, EAB offer members many resources to support institution resource allocation more broadly. This publication focuses on the core mechanics of building or tweaking a budget model. However, institutional leaders can pursue several other strategies to ensure the effectiveness of budget model changes—including program prioritization, supporting stakeholders with data, and conducting vacancy reviews. These strategies and others are detailed in the resources listed below, all of which are available on eab.com.

Core Budget Model Mechanics

- Allocating Revenues
- Allocating Costs
- Building Central Reserves
- Subventing Mission-Critical Units
- Incenting Strategic Goals

Actions to Support Model Changes

- Conducting Program Prioritization to Identify Opportunities for Strategic Reallocation
- Supporting Deans with Academic Analytics and Market Analysis
- Implementing Vacancy Review Policies
- Driving Central Administrative Unit Efficiencies

Studies

- **Optimizing Institutional Budget Models**
  Draw on detailed compendium of 29 budget model elements to develop a more strategic resource allocation system

- **Increasing Central Fundable Dollars**
  Increase central dollars to fund and garner support for critical, cross-unit investments

- **Bending the Administrative Labor Cost Curve**
  Implement cross-silo tools and incentives that slow administrative labor growth and help achieve meaningful savings

- **Revitalizing the Program Portfolio**
  Use program review to improve and prioritize programs for investment and expansion by integrating data on academic quality, student demand, and resource utilization

- **Breaking the Tradeoff Between Cost and Quality**
  Enhance academic quality and drive program efficiencies by reallocating resources from lower impact activities to higher impact, mission-aligned priorities

- **Developing a Data-Driven University**
  Develop business intelligence capabilities to support analytics, dashboards, and change-management initiatives

Toolkit

- **Center for Administrative Excellence**
  Compendium of all BAF resources to drive administrative unit effectiveness and leverage efficiencies

Source: Business Affairs Forum interviews and analysis.
Creating Unit-Level Financial Accountability

Incenting Program Growth Through Revenue Allocation

- **Decision Point 1**: What percentage of tuition revenue should we allocate through an activity-based formula?
- **Decision Point 2**: How should we weight SCH versus majors in tuition allocation?
- **Decision Point 3**: Should we use enrollment smoothing to allocate tuition revenue?
- **Decision Point 4**: Should we allocate any forms of differential tuition revenue?
- **Decision Point 5**: Should we allocate unrestricted state appropriations?

Driving Unit-Level Cost Containment

- **Decision Point 6**: How do we allocate overhead costs to maximize incentives and maintain buy-in?
- **Decision Point 7**: How do we regulate unit spending to protect institution finances and strategic goals?
Relying on the Deans

Deans Possess Knowledge to Grow Programs and Reduce Costs

Deans are central to any efforts to grow revenues and contain costs. While senior executives are well-suited to set long-term strategy and align units with overall institutional financial goals, much of the information required to grow existing programs or reduce spending exists at the front-line, unit level. For example, deans best understand how to adapt academic programs to meet uncaptured student demand or reduce space utilization. However, units could fail to appropriately act on this information, as they may lack proper budgetary incentives, be overly focused on mission, or fear growth activities will increase costs more than new resources.

Information Asymmetry

**CBO Knowledge**
- Overall institutional financial health
- Strategies for long-term financial sustainability
- Unit alignment with institutional goal and priorities

**Dean Knowledge**
- Academic programs in high demand
- How to adapt existing curricula to changing market
- Opportunities to reduce space utilization

Source: Business Affairs Forum interviews and analysis.
Allocating Revenue and Costs to Instill Financial Accountability

As institutions seek to better align financial incentives for units, there are three primary levels of financial accountability, with each step up typically representing a more effective method.

- **Incremental Budgeting**: Incremental budgeting creates relatively low accountability, as units receive a guaranteed amount of resources each year regardless of activity.

- **Greater Financial Transparency**: Many institutions have begun to produce clear unit financial and contribution margin data, with the partial goal of creating social pressure for academic unit leaders to improve unit finances. While greater transparency is valuable overall, it may not provide a meaningful incentive for units to better manage their P+L.

- **Revenue and Cost Allocation**: Institutions create the greatest financial accountability by directly allocating some revenues and costs to academic units. In addition to creating financial transparency, revenue and cost allocation ties unit resources to performance. This compels units to identify opportunities to grow programs, reallocate resources, or reduce costs.

The first section of this publication details seven executive-level revenue and cost decision points. These decisions points help executives optimize revenue and cost allocation design to best incent program growth and drive cost containment, thereby instilling unit-level financial accountability.

---

1) Profit and loss statement.

Source: Business Affairs Forum interviews and analysis.
What percentage of tuition revenue should we allocate through an activity-based formula?

Decision Point in Brief

**Importance to Budget Model**
The percentage of activity-based revenue allocation in the budget model impacts the strength of unit financial incentives to grow revenue and the models’ ability to shift resources to high-importance or high-growth areas.

**Observed Options**
There is wide range in the percentage of tuition revenue that institutions allocate via activity-based formulas. Institutions with incremental or zero-based models do not allocate any revenue based on activity levels, while institutions with full RCM allocate 100% of tuition revenue to reward activity. Many institutions utilize models between the two extremes, allocating a percentage of funds based on credit-hour production while maintaining some level of incremental budgeting.

**EAB Guidance**
While a minority of institutions with unique characteristics (e.g., highly consistent leadership, strong religious mission) can successfully maintain centralized models, **most institutions should allocate 70% of tuition revenue or more through an activity-based formula.** A high degree of activity-based revenue allocation promotes financial accountability, as units must consider their unit P+L holistically and reallocate resources across programs to maximize their allocation. Moreover, greater activity-based revenue allocation unlocks historical unit base budgets, allowing resources to flow organically to high-growth areas.
Institutions Adopt Models with Varying Degrees of Activity-Based Allocation

The first executive-level decision point is to determine the percentage of tuition revenue to allocate to academic units through an activity-based formula. In activity-based revenue allocation, units receive financial resources based on their share of student activity as defined by the institution (e.g., number of students enrolled, student credit hours taught). As shown below, there is a wide range in the percentage of tuition revenue institutions allocate to their units. The far left of the spectrum represents institutions with incremental or zero-based budget models that do not allocate any tuition revenue through an activity-based formula.

Moving to the right, some institutions utilize predominantly incremental models with small performance pots that reward credit-hour activity. The University of Utah allocates a small percentage of funds to reward activity. Other institutions like Ohio State allocate only new revenue while maintaining historical unit base budgets. While functionally similar to the University of Utah’s model, this approach may be easier for some academic leaders to understand and react to.

The other side of the spectrum represents institutions that allocate the vast majority of tuition revenue through an activity-based formula. At UC Davis, 70% of tuition revenue rewards activity while the remaining 30% is allocated incrementally. Institutions on the far right use full RCM models, allocating 100% of tuition revenue based on activity.

The next several pages provide more detailed information and guidance on the various approaches to activity-based tuition revenue allocation.

Source: The Ohio State University, Columbus, OH; University of California Davis, Davis, CA; University of Utah, Salt Lake City, UT; Business Affairs Forum interviews and analysis.
Select Institutions Successfully Use Centralized Models

First, some institutions have deliberately maintained highly centralized budget models without formulaic tuition revenue allocation. For example, Arizona State University controls the budget process at the center and dictates funding for most unit-level initiatives. Rather than allocating revenue and costs to promote unit-level accountability, leaders at Arizona State promote financial stewardship through strong central oversight and guidance. Similarly, the University of Notre Dame uses a primarily incremental model with targeted strategic investments. To promote accountability and alignment with institutional goals, units must present three-year business plans detailing college-level priorities and justifications for additional funds from central administration.

While centralized budget models work well on some campuses, this is partially due to hard-to-replicate institutional characteristics—such as highly consistent leadership, a strong shared religious mission, or a lack of silo problems common at large institutions. Colleges and universities in these situations will (correctly) continue to leverage a highly centralized model. Their greatest opportunities for improvement are likely better regulating unit-level spending and incorporating strategic goals into budgeting, detailed in later sections of this publication.

Absent these rare circumstances, the limits of incremental budgeting eventually become apparent, including a lack of unit-level financial accountability and incentives for growth. Therefore, most institutions are actively exploring some degree of revenue allocation. In fact, even Notre Dame has established revenue sharing agreements to grow its professional Master’s programs.
Decision Point 1: Tuition revenue allocation percentage

Allocating Only New Revenue Insufficient
Prevents Fund Reallocation and Undermines Holistic Financial Accountability

Seeking to create revenue growth incentives, most institutions have moved to models with at least a small percentage of activity-based allocation. At Underwood University, units retain new revenue generated through increased credit hour production, while historical base budgets roll over year-to-year. In theory, this model balances incentives for growth with stability—academic units have an incentive to increase credit hour production with the safety net of a guaranteed base budget each year.

However, this model has several limitations. First, the model mostly encourages marginal revenue growth. Because units receive consistent base budgets each year, they lack an incentive to consider their P+L holistically, reprioritize resources across programs, or reduce spending. Second, the model impedes reallocation of resources across the institution, as the majority of funds are locked in base budgets.

Due to these limitations, Underwood University plans to transition to a model with a higher degree of activity-based tuition revenue allocation.

Underwood University1 Moving Toward Greater Revenue Allocation to Promote Unit-Level Financial Accountability

Current Modified RCM Model

- Units receive historical base-budgets each year
- Awards incremental revenues from increased SCH production and tuition increases to units formulaically to encourage and reward growth
- Incremental revenues absorbed into base budgets for subsequent years
- Goal is to perform rebasing exercise every decade to right-size inaccuracies in historical base budgets

Current Model Limitations

- Focuses purely on marginal gains rather than holistic unit financial performance
- Units not incented to make targeted investments or divestments within departments or programs as they are guaranteed a base-budget each year
- Prevents reallocation of funds across the institution
- Absorption of marginal growth into base budgets creates lack of transparency and accountability

"Our current model focuses too much on marginal transactions...the units come back each year with their hands out [for their base budget] and the tough conversations about 'right your ship' don't happen."

Budget Director
Underwood University

1) Pseudonym.

Source: Business Affairs Forum interviews and analysis.
Erring on the Side of Allocation

Full Activity-Based Allocation Unlocks Base Budgets, Incent Growth

Excepting a minority of institutions with effective centralized models, EAB recommends that most institutions allocate 70% of tuition revenue or more via an activity-based formula for two major reasons. First, greater activity-based revenue allocation unlocks historical base budgets. Rather than flowing to the same units each year due to historical precedent, resources subject to an activity-based formula will respond to market conditions and flow organically to areas of high-importance. Second, a high degree of activity-based revenue allocation encourages greater unit-level financial accountability. When institutions allocate the majority of revenue based on activity levels, the majority of a unit’s budget is contingent on performance. Therefore, units must consider P+L holistically and seek growth, reallocation, and cost-control opportunities.

To be clear, institutions must also implement safeguards to balance incentives for revenue growth and ensure unit investments align with institutional goals and priorities. Sections 2 and 3 of this publication detail strategies institutions can adopt to maintain central oversight and structure subvention in decentralized models. Nonetheless, allocating the bulk of tuition revenue to the units is the engine that makes the model and the incentives work.

Percentage of Tuition Revenue Allocated Through Activity-Based Formula

Works for a Few...
Select institutions with particular culture, mission, and leadership team can succeed with largely centralized budget models

...But Most Should Be Here
- Creates organic flow of resources and unlocks unit base budgets for reallocation across institution
- Instills unit-level financial accountability and need to examine value of programs and make targeted reallocations

Source: Business Affairs Forum interviews and analysis.
Decision Point 1: Tuition revenue allocation percentage

Whose Line (Item) Is It, Anyway?

Center Can Retain Necessary Funds Up-Front or Recoup on the Back End

Beyond the percentage of tuition revenue to allocate through an activity-based formula, institutions must also consider a technical aspect of revenue allocation—the sequence of funds flow between central administration and academic units. Even in highly decentralized models that allocate all or the majority of revenue to the academic units, central administration requires resources to fund central overhead, subvention, and strategic reserves.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Allocation Approach</th>
<th>Step 1</th>
<th>Step 2</th>
<th>Step 3</th>
<th>Sample Institution</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Front-End</strong></td>
<td>Revenue</td>
<td>Central Admin pulls out:</td>
<td>Allocation Methodology</td>
<td>Simon Fraser University</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Central Admin</td>
<td>• Central overhead</td>
<td></td>
<td>35% of all revenues taken off-the-top for central costs, indirect costs, and institutional priorities</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Colleges charged:</td>
<td>• Subvention</td>
<td></td>
<td>Academic Colleges</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Strategic initiatives</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Back-End</strong></td>
<td>Revenue</td>
<td>Allocation Methodology</td>
<td>Universities charged:</td>
<td>University of Pennsylvania</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Central Admin</td>
<td>• Central overhead</td>
<td>20% tax on undergraduate, graduate, and professional tuition for subvention and strategic initiatives; allocates central overhead costs to colleges through six cost pools</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Colleges charged:</td>
<td>• Subvention</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Strategic initiatives</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

There are two options, shown above. With the front-end approach, central administration takes necessary funds off-the-top and then allocates the remaining funds to the academic units through the revenue-allocation formula. The other option is the back-end approach, where revenue flows to the academic units and then central administration charges or taxes units for their share of costs. Mathematically, both approaches result in the same amount of resources to fund central costs. However, they can have different impact on cost and revenue incentives.

Source: Simon Fraser University, Burnaby, BC; University of Pennsylvania, Philadelphia, PA; Business Affairs Forum interviews and analysis.
Better to Recoup Central Dollars After Allocation
Flow of Funds Affects P+L Transparency

In general, recouping funds on the back end creates stronger budget model incentives by maintaining P+L clarity and transparency hurts deans’ ability to make informed business decisions. Even if deans’ activities leads to actual enrollment growth, taking funds off-the-top distorts unit revenue allocations and hurts deans’ ability to make informed business decisions. This can make units less likely to change behaviors or invest resources toward growth.

The one exception to this rule is strategic reserves, for which both approaches have advantages. Taxing units for strategic initiatives on the back end preserves P+L transparency, but the amount of central strategic dollars shrinks if unit revenues decline. On the other hand, taking funds off-the-top guarantees a certain level of strategic funds for central administration, but this approach can obscure P+L transparency.

![Front-End Approach Obscures Revenue Sources and P+L](source: Business Affairs Forum interviews and analysis.

“"Our current approach is like a big washing machine for revenue—we take some pieces out for central initiatives and then allocate revenue to the colleges as one lump sum. We aren’t able to produce P+Ls for individual colleges because the revenue streams lose their source. The colleges don’t know how much money they are generating, so they can’t make good business decisions.”

Chief Budget Officer
Large Public Research University
How should we weight SCH versus majors in tuition allocation?

Decision Point in Brief

Importance to Budget Model
Institutions must strike the right balance between credit hours and majors when allocating tuition revenue to incent desired growth activities, avoid perverse incentives, and properly resource academic units. Moreover, the allocation weighting between student credit hours (SCH) and majors is critical for many campus stakeholders’ buy-in.

Observed Options
Institutions take various approaches to weighting tuition revenue allocations between SCH and majors. Allocations weighted toward SCH reward teaching, but may create perverse incentives to create duplicative courses to poach credit hours from other colleges. Revenue allocations based on student majors reduce the incentive to poach, but this method may not adequately compensate colleges for the variable costs of teaching. Most institutions utilize a tuition revenue allocation weighting between 85/15 and 70/30 in favor of credit hours.

EAB Guidance
Provided that the weighting is within an appropriate range, the exact split will not significantly change the outcomes of the model. When building the allocation model, senior leaders should define a suitable range and then allow the deans and budget taskforce to ultimately identify an allocation weighting they collectively agree on, which will significantly increase that groups buy-in for the model. Note, executives may need to revisit this several years after model implementation to meet stakeholder demands for a more sophisticated analysis.
Decision Point 2: Tuition revenue allocation weighting

No Magic Number

Executives Should Define Range, Let Dean Preferences Guide Allocation Weight

After deciding how much tuition revenue to allocate through an activity-based formula, the natural next consideration is how to weight the allocation between student credit hours (SCH) and majors. The well-known trade-offs between the two approaches are depicted below. Allocations based on SCH rewards teaching, but may create a perverse incentive to create duplicative courses to poach credit hours from other colleges. Revenue allocations based on student majors reduces the incentive to poach, but this method may not adequately compensate colleges for the variable costs of teaching. So, institutions must strike the right balance to avoid perverse incentives and provide adequate resources to units.

Provided that the weighting is within an appropriate range, the exact allocation split will not significantly change the outcomes of the model. In other words, there is no magic number. The vast majority of institutions have found an appropriate balance between an 85/15 and 70/30 weighting in favor of credit hours. EAB recommends that executives propose a weighting within this range and then largely leave the final numbers as a decision to be made by the deans and budget taskforce to win buy-in for the model.

Source: Miami University, Oxford, OH; New York University, New York, NY; Ohio University, Athens, OH; Rutgers University, New Brunswick, NJ; South Dakota State University, Brookings, SD; University of Wisconsin Madison, Madison, WI; Business Affairs Forum interviews and analysis.
Prepare to Revisit the Allocation Weighting Down the Road

While the exact allocation weighting may not require significant executive attention in the initial model design, this issue can become contentious in the years following model implementation. Once faculty better understand the model mechanics, they may push back on a “one-size-fits-all” revenue split for all colleges. In particular, colleges that perform a high volume of cross-teaching may not feel adequately compensated for increased costs.

The University of Toronto, which implemented an RCM model in 2008, experienced this situation between the faculty of Arts and Sciences and faculty of Engineering. Like at most institutions, Arts and Sciences taught many Engineering students, both for core requirements and electives. Because Arts and Sciences did not feel adequately compensated for cross-teaching, the college eventually stopped scheduling courses around Engineering labs and deprioritized Engineering students on waitlists. Additionally, Arts and Sciences hired more adjunct professors to reduce labor costs, which hurt Engineering’s accreditation standards that require full-time faculty teach a certain percent of courses.

Source: University of Toronto, Toronto, ON; Business Affairs Forum interviews and analysis.
Recalibrating Cross-Teaching Incentives

University of Toronto Calculates Cost of Interdisciplinary Teaching

To recalibrate incentives and appease the faculty, executives at the University of Toronto transitioned to a more precise revenue-sharing agreement between Arts and Sciences (A&S) and Engineering. In sum, Arts and Sciences receives a percentage of Engineering revenue based on its share of total Engineering program expenses. The detailed calculation is detailed below.

First, executives calculate a rough cost of each section, factoring in instructor costs, plus division and university overhead. Next, they sum the costs of all Arts and Sciences sections that enrolled Engineering students, including Engineering core curriculum requirements as well as electives. Third, they divide that number by the full cost of all sections across campus with Engineering students, which represents the percentage of Engineering teaching costs borne by Arts and Sciences. Ultimately, that percentage becomes the new revenue share between the faculties. After revenue is allocated to Engineering based 100% on majors, Engineering will then pass on the calculated percentage of revenue to Arts and Sciences.

In just one year, the revenue sharing agreement successfully recalibrated incentives. First, Arts and Sciences increased course access for Engineering students with priority seats and additional night courses. Second, with the additional revenue, Arts and Sciences hired more full-time faculty, ensuring Engineering meets accreditation requirements. The University of Toronto tentatively plans to replicate this agreement between Arts and Sciences and five other academic units.

Source: University of Toronto, Toronto, ON; Business Affairs Forum interviews and analysis.
Should we use enrollment smoothing to allocate tuition revenue?

Decision Point in Brief

Importance to Budget Model
The number of years of enrollment data used to determine revenue allocations impacts stability of unit budgets and how quickly allocations increase to reflect growth—and therefore the strength of financial incentives.

Observed Options
Institutions typically take one of two competing approaches to determine tuition revenue allocations for academic units. The more common approach is to base tuition allocations on one year of enrollment, either prior year or current-year projections. This approach rewards academic unit growth with immediate increases in next year’s allocations but may create volatility in unit budgets and impede deans’ ability to plan. Alternatively, some institutions have opted for a multi-year averaging approach known as enrollment smoothing, where tuition revenue allocations are based on two to four years of enrollments. This method creates more stability and provides deans adequate time to adjust to enrollment declines, but creates a lag between enrollment growth and funding—potentially weakening the incentive for growth.

EAB Guidance
Institutions can achieve the benefits of both approaches by basing tuition-revenue allocations on one year of enrollment and establishing a central loan pool to support units with sudden enrollment declines. This creates strong incentives by quickly rewarding units that achieve growth while providing a safety net for units facing unexpected declines.
Decision Point 3: Enrollment smoothing

Quickly Rewarding Growth Versus Predictability

Institutions typically take one of two approaches when allocating tuition revenue to academic units and colleges, as shown below. The more common approach is to base tuition revenue allocations on one year of enrollment, either prior year or current-year projections. This approach quickly rewards colleges for enrollment growth, immediately increasing revenue allocations the next year and ensuring they receive the necessary resources to offset potentially higher costs associated with that growth. However, this method may create volatility in unit budgets and impede deans’ ability to plan. One year of severe enrollment declines could send a college into crisis mode, leaving it without sufficient resources to fund operations or potentially triggering damaging cuts.

Quickly Reward Growth    Predictability

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>One year</th>
<th>Multi-year</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Approach</td>
<td>Enrollment figures from one year used to calculate tuition revenue allocation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Multi-year enrollment averages used to calculate tuition allocation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Advantage</td>
<td>Units quickly rewarded for new revenue growth, creating stronger incentive</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Mitigates against dramatic enrollment declines and gives deans greater predictability</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Disadvantage</td>
<td>Units may experience volatility in budgets, unpredictable for deans</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Creates lag between activity and funding, hurting units that grow costs</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Example Institution</td>
<td>South Dakota State University allocates tuition revenue based on current-year enrollment figures</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Miami University of Ohio allocates tuition revenue on a four-year rolling enrollment average</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

To combat budget volatility, some institutions have opted to base tuition revenue allocations on multi-year averages, an approach commonly known as enrollment smoothing. Institutions that use enrollment smoothing base tuition revenue allocations on two to four years of enrollment, which creates stability and provides deans adequate time to adjust to enrollment declines by spreading losses over multiple years. However, this approach creates a lag between enrollment growth and corresponding funding, which can weaken the incentive for growth and leave units without adequate resources to pay additional costs borne to pursue that growth (e.g., faculty lines for a new program launch).

Source: Miami University, Oxford, OH; South Dakota State University, Brookings, SD; Business Affairs Forum interviews and analysis.
Decision Point 3: Enrollment smoothing

Seeking the Middle Way

UW-Madison’s Two-Year Average Weights Most Recent Year More Heavily

Seeking to strike the balance between predictability and quickly rewarding growth, the University of Wisconsin-Madison developed the formula below as a compromise approach. The simple formula averages the past two years of enrollments, but weights the most recent year double. The two-year average mitigates the impact of enrollment declines, while the emphasis on last year’s enrollment still strongly rewards colleges for recent credit-hour activity.

\[
\text{Adjusted Enrollment for Allocation} = \frac{2 \times (\text{Prior-Year Enrollment}) + \text{Prior-Prior-Year Enrollment}}{3}
\]

Source: University of Wisconsin-Madison, Madison, WI; Business Affairs Forum interviews and analysis..
Decision Point 3: Enrollment smoothing

The Best of Both Worlds

Complement Revenue Allocation with Loan Pool

For a more complicated but potentially more impactful approach, EAB recommends that institutions base tuition revenue allocations on one year of enrollment projections and establish a central loan pool to support units with sudden or unexpected enrollment declines. This approach captures the advantages of the two traditional approaches. It creates a strong incentive for enrollment growth by quickly rewarding units with increased allocations. At the same time, units with sudden drops in enrollment receive central funds they must pay back over time, effectively spreading losses over multiple years and giving deans time to adjust and plan.

As shown above, Case Western University bases revenue allocations on current-year projections and offers loans to help colleges experiencing unforeseen declines, as needed. In the top scenario, College A’s enrollment meets or exceeds expectations, so the college is immediately rewarded with additional revenue the next year. On the bottom, College A’s enrollments does not meet projections, so they receive less revenue the next year. Rather than absorbing the entire loss in one year, College A may request a loan from central administration and pay it back over several years.

South Dakota State University utilizes a similar central loan pool structure. To request a loan, units must submit a detailed form, including justification for the loan, corrective action they plan to take, and a repayment schedule. A full version of South Dakota State’s request form is available on the following page.

Source: Case Western Reserve University, Cleveland, OH; South Dakota State University, Brookings, SD; Business Affairs Forum interviews and analysis.
South Dakota State University’s Risk Management Request Form

Risk Management Request Form

Unit Requesting Risk Management:

Requested Amount:

Request Date:

Explanation of Unforeseen External Shock Causing the Need for Risk Management Assistance:

(Provide Response Here)

Corrective Action Taken for Next Fiscal Year to Adjust Budget in Response to External Shock:

(Provide Response Here)

Explanation of Expenditure Reductions or Revenue Increases used to Generate Loan Repayment:

(Provide Response Here)

Repayment Terms:

Amount: _______

Years (1 to 3): _____

Repayment Schedule:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Amount</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Year 1 (FYXX)</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Year 2 (FYXX)</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Year 3 (FYXX)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Signatures:

______________________________
Unit Leader

______________________________  ______________________________
Provost/VP Academic Affairs   VP Finance & Business

ATTEST:

______________________________  ______________________________
President                     Chair of Faculty Budget Committee
Should we allocate any forms of differential tuition revenue?

Decision Point in Brief

**Importance to Budget Model**
Allocating or not allocating differential tuition revenue directly to the academic units impacts the budget model’s level of transparency and can alter model incentives or create unintended new incentives.

**Observed Options**
Institutions either allocate out-of-state tuition and financial aid differentials directly to the academic units, or instead allocate an average rate per student regardless of student. Direct allocation of non-resident tuition or financial aid costs may create perverse incentives to focus recruitment efforts on particular types of students. While less common, some institutions’ models artificially weight credit hours to allocate more resources to colleges with higher costs of instruction.

**EAB Guidance**
Aside from rare exceptions, institutions should not use weighted credit hours or directly allocate out-of-state tuition or financial aid differentials. Rather, institutions should average or “wash out” differential tuition to avoid perverse incentives, keep units focused on growth activities, and maintain model transparency.
Three Types of Differential Tuition Warrant Executive Attention

The fourth decision point centers on whether to allocate three different forms of differential tuition depicted below. The first type is out-of-state tuition. Public institutions must consider whether to allocate non-resident tuition differentials directly to the colleges or instead allocate average tuition rates regardless of residency. Similarly, institutions can either allocate tuition revenue minus each unit’s share of financial aid or allocate a flat financial aid rate to all units. Lastly, some institutions artificially weight the tuition revenue allocation formula to provide more resources to colleges with higher instructional costs. The next several pages provide further details on each type of differential tuition.

Out-of-State Tuition
Tension between recruiting brightest and highest paying students across the nation without creating incentive for disproportionate recruitment of non-resident students

Financial Aid
Allocating financial aid directly to colleges results in differential tuition based on the type of students enrolled, and may create disincentive to enroll students with greater financial need

Weighted Credit Hours
Institutions artificially weight the tuition revenue allocation formula to recognize the differential teaching costs between colleges

Source: Business Affairs Forum interviews and analysis.
The first kind of differential tuition is out-of-state tuition. In general, EAB recommends that most institutions “wash out” the non-resident tuition differential by averaging tuition into a single per-student rate. This way, units will receive the same amount of revenue for in-state and out-of-state students. Two primary reasons are detailed on the left. First, units typically have little control over the enrollment mix, which is often part of the larger institutional enrollment strategy. Units should focus their energies improving P+L, not trying to alter enrollment mix at the margins. Second, as legislatures increasingly scrutinize the mix of in-state and out-of-state students, there is political danger for institutions to incent disproportionate recruitment of non-residents.

The one exception to the rule is shown on the right. A few institutions seeking to promote prestigious programs nationwide choose to allocate out-of-state differentials to units to reward those programs. As an example, the Business and Engineering schools at Miami of Ohio attract many non-residents, and differential tuition revenue has further enabled their growth. If rewarding prestige is a top priority, institutions can consider passing on non-resident tuition to units. Otherwise, most institutions should average out the difference to avoid perverse incentives and political danger.
Decision Point 4: Differential tuition allocation

**Most Should Wash Out Financial Aid Differentials**

The second form of differential tuition revenue is financial aid. While typically viewed as a cost, institutions that allocate financial aid to the units effectively allocate discounted tuition. As shown on the graph below, colleges that enroll students with greater financial need receive less tuition revenue when financial aid costs are borne by the units.

**Miami of Ohio’s Methodology for Financial Aid**

1. Calculate flat rate per FTE. In this example, average student contribution is $20K.

2. Allocate flat rate uniformly to colleges as direct expense. In this example, each college is charged $10K per student for financial aid.

"Our undergraduate discounting method is an important component of our overall enrollment strategy, so we want to keep the amount of aid awarded as a central strategic decision."

*David Ellis, Associate VP for Budgeting and Analysis, Miami University*

Like out-of-state tuition, EAB recommends for most institutions to wash out financial aid, allocating revenue based on an average student contribution rate. As shown in the example above, revenue allocations are based on a $20K per student average, regardless of individual students' level of financial need. Similar to out-of-state tuition, institutions primarily wash out financial aid because units cannot easily inflect this cost. Central administration typically awards financial aid as part of the larger strategic enrollment strategy, so institutions do not want to penalize units for a decision outside of their control.

Source: Miami University, Oxford, OH; Business Affairs Forum interviews and analysis.
Avoiding Artificial Weighted Credit Hours

Weighted SCHs Distort P+L, Create Perverse Incentives and Disparities

The last form of differential tuition is weighted credit hours. This methodology is distinct from extra program fees such as lab fees or differing tuition rates charged up front by colleges (institutions nearly always pass on these forms of differential tuition to colleges). Instead, some institutions artificially weight credit hours to recognize different costs of instruction. As illustrated here, students pay the same tuition rate, but Engineering credits count 20% extra in the internal budget model formula. Therefore, the College of Engineering receives a higher allocation while Education and Arts and Sciences receive lower allocations than they would have under equal credit hour weighting.

While sound in theory, this practice is not recommended for the three reasons listed on the right. EAB believes that first, weighting credit hours distorts unit P+L and obscures the link between revenue generated and allocations received. This ultimately undercuts the incentives the budget model is designed to create. Second, weighting credit hours may create perverse incentives for units or departments to game the system. At one institution, faculty deliberately re-listed existing courses from lower-weighted departments to higher-weighted ones to capture a greater share of revenue. Last, determining the appropriate weighting is time-consuming and complicated, requiring recalibration every year or two.

Rather than weight credit hours, institutions should rely on the subvention methodology (discussed in Section 2 of this publication) to allocate additional resources to units with higher instructional costs.
Should we allocate unrestricted state appropriations?

Decision Point in Brief

Importance to Budget Model
The approach public institutions take to allocate unrestricted state appropriations primarily impacts the amount of flexible funds central leadership can deploy outside the activity-based allocation formula. This decision also has a strong downstream impact on other important budget model elements such as subvention and strategic reserves.

Observed Options
Historically, most public institutions combined tuition and state dollars into a single pool of revenue to allocate to the units. The other option is to allocate tuition revenue through the activity-based formula, but hold state appropriations centrally to fund subvention or strategic reserves. While less common in the past, more institutions are adopting this approach to shield deans from volatile state funds, decrease unit reliance on state funds, and provide central administration with more flexible dollars.

EAB Guidance
Though public institutions increasingly hold state appropriations centrally for subvention and strategic allocation, either approach is acceptable. The key is for leaders to decide early in the budget model design process, as this decision influences the structure of other important budget model elements such as subvention and strategic reserves.
Public Institutions Trending Toward Holding State Funds Centrally for Allocation

The final revenue decision point centers on unrestricted state appropriations. Although volatile in recent years, state appropriations still represent a significant source of revenue for most public institutions. Generally, institutions can take one of two approaches to allocate unrestricted state dollars. Historically, most public institutions combined tuition and state dollars into a single pool of revenue to allocate to the units, shown below on the left. The other increasingly popular option is to allocate tuition revenue through the activity-based formula, but hold state appropriations centrally to fund subvention or strategic reserves.

There are three reasons more institutions are adopting this approach. First, institutions seek to shield units from increasing volatility in state funds. Second, this approach educates units on the reality of increased tuition-dependency in higher education and encourages them to become profitable without relying on state funds. Third, as more institutions adopt models with formulaic resource allocation, this approach also provides central administration with more flexible dollars. State funds are still ultimately passed down to the units, but unlike revenue subject to the allocation formula, central administration can strategically allocate state dollars based on subvention or strategic priorities. Importantly, institutions must be wary of state government scrutiny, as state officials may mistakenly believe state appropriations are funding central administration.

Though public institutions increasingly hold state appropriations centrally for subvention and/or strategic allocation, either approach is acceptable. The key is for leaders to decide early in the budget model design process, as this decision influences the structure of other important budget model elements such as subvention and strategic reserves.

Source: Kent State University, Kent, OH; Business Affairs Forum interviews and analysis.
How do we allocate overhead costs to maximize incentives and maintain buy-in?

Decision Point in Brief

Importance to Budget Model
Institutions must incorporate overhead cost allocation into the budget model for three primary reasons. First and most obviously, as institutions allocate a greater portion of revenue to the academic units, they must necessarily allocate indirect costs to fund institutional overhead. Second, cost allocation creates P+L accuracy and transparency, and educates units on the full cost of business operations. Lastly, cost allocation can create meaningful incentives to reduce spending.

Observed Options
Institutions take differing approaches to cost allocation, leaning toward either simplicity or precision. Institutions that prioritize simplicity combine overhead costs into one or two cost pools for allocation. However, overly simplistic models are often inaccurate and may not create incentives to reduce costs. Conversely, institutions that desire a very precise methodology allocate dozens of distinct costs. However, charging for costs that units cannot control dilutes incentives and spreads their attention too thin.

EAB Guidance
To create meaningful incentives to reduce unit consumption of institutional overhead, institutions must strike the right balance between precision and simplicity. Institutions should aim to charge four to six cost pools with one to two cost drivers per pool to achieve an optimal balance. In particular, institutions should break out costs that are easy to measure and within units’ ability to control, and incorporate remaining costs into a general university overhead pool. However, it is crucial for executives to be flexible and tweak the model as necessary to maintain stakeholder buy-in for cost allocation. For example, institutions may need to break out additional costs (e.g., costs not attributable to every unit) to help academic leaders understand the reason behind general overhead cost increases.
Institutions Struggle to Maintain Simplicity Amid Calls for Precision

Cost allocation is often one of the most contentious aspects of a budget model change or redesign. In fact, arguments about cost allocation have derailed model transitions at several institutions. This tension arises from the difficulty in balancing simplicity and precision in the cost allocation methodology. On one hand, institutions have hundreds of indirect costs, many of which lack a clear allocation metric. To simplify the model, many institutions group costs together for allocation. On the other hand, simplicity makes the model less accurate—which creates pushback from units that demand precision and resent paying more than their "fair share." Since institutions have a set amount of overhead, cost allocation becomes a zero-sum game that creates a "winners-and-losers” mentality and can turn colleges against each other.

To help executives strike the right balance between simplicity and precision, this decision point will focus on how to best structure cost allocation to create impactful cost-control incentives as well as proven change management tactics to win stakeholder buy-in for the cost allocation methodology.

Source: Kent State University, Kent, OH; Business Affairs Forum interviews and analysis.
When designing cost allocation, executives must first determine the number of cost pools to allocate to academic units. To clarify, institutions should allocate all indirect costs to create unit accountability and maintain P+L transparency. However, the number of distinct cost pools used to allocate indirect costs impacts the strength of P+L incentives.

The graph below depicts the relationship between the number of cost pools and likelihood to inflect unit behavior. On one hand, utilizing only one or two cost pools is often too simplistic. Units cannot see individual costs or the impact on allocations, so they have no incentive to change behavior. On the other hand, incenting units against dozens of costs outside of their control dilutes the incentives and spreads their attention too thin.

EAB recommends that institutions allocate between four and six costs pools to create the most impactful incentives. This range represents a manageable number of pools for units to focus their efforts on while maintaining a level of precision to win stakeholder buy-in.
To Charge or Not to Charge?

Break Out Easily Measured, Controllable Costs to Inflect Behavior Change

In determining which four to six cost pools will create the most impactful incentives, executives should focus on costs that are both easy to measure and within units’ ability to control. The graph below plots potential cost buckets by these two considerations. For example, many institutions break space usage into a distinct cost. On the other hand, measuring unit consumption of costs such as business services or the library is difficult, and incenting departments and colleges to reduce use of these services may actually be counterproductive. Therefore, most institutions combine these costs into a larger general administration bucket.

Source: Business Affairs Forum interviews and analysis.
Decision Point 6: Overhead cost allocation

Keeping It Simple

Select One or Two Cost Drivers per Cost Pool

The final step in cost allocation design is to assign drivers or metrics to each cost pool that determine unit allocations. The table below summarizes appropriate drivers for each pool. Within these options, the actual metric used to allocate each cost pool will not significantly change outcomes—executives should ultimately choose the metrics that win buy-in from campus stakeholders. More importantly, EAB advises executives to prioritize simplicity, assigning only one or two cost drivers to each pool so that units can easily understand and respond to incentives.

**Suggested Allocation Approaches for Overhead Cost Pools**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Expense</th>
<th>Revenue Tax</th>
<th>Expense Tax</th>
<th>Faculty FTE</th>
<th>Staff FTE</th>
<th>Student FTE</th>
<th>SCH</th>
<th>Other</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>G&amp;A</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Business Services</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td></td>
<td>✓</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Academic Affairs</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td></td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>Majors, Degrees</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Library</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IT</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>Fee-for service</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Facilities</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>✓</td>
<td></td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>Asgn. Sq.Ft, Quality Asgn Sq.Ft</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Research</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td></td>
<td>✓</td>
<td></td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>ICR, ICR Tax</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Business Affairs Forum interviews and analysis.
Allow for Some Complexity, Move Toward Simplicity Over Time

In sum, EAB recommends that institutions allocate four to six cost pools with one or two cost drivers each to most effectively balance simplicity and precision in cost allocation. However, given the high tension surrounding cost allocation, it is crucial for executives to be flexible and tweak the model as necessary to maintain stakeholder buy-in for the model.

For example, to appease unit demands for precision, many institutions must implement a more complex model initially and slowly migrate to a simpler model over time. Three examples of institutions that moved from complex to simpler models are shown in the table on the left. Additionally, some institutions periodically tweak the cost allocation model as deans turnover and alternate between calls for simplicity and precision.

Institutions Moved to Simpler Cost Methodologies Later on…

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Institution</th>
<th>Initial Number of Pools</th>
<th>Revised Number of Pools</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>University of Pennsylvania</td>
<td>20+</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>University of Southern California</td>
<td>100+</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>University of Delaware</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

...But Old Arguments May Resurface Over Time

“Every five years or so, a new group of deans will want to move in the opposite direction on the spectrum between simplicity and precision. The pendulum swings back and forth.”

Stephen Golding, CBO
Ohio University

Source: Ohio University, Athens, OH; University of Delaware, Newark, DE; University of Pennsylvania, Philadelphia, PA; University of Southern California, Los Angeles, CA; Business Affairs Forum interviews and analysis.
Evolution Cost Allocation with Campus Concerns

Two Types of Overhead Costs May Require Breakout as Model Matures

While the goal is to move toward a simpler model over time, there are two instances where it may be prudent to break out additional cost pools to maintain stakeholder buy-in. First, some costs are not attributable to every unit—for instance, the graduate school clearly does not utilize undergraduate advising services. In general, EAB recommends that institutions adopt Temple University’s approach, where all units share in all costs in the name of supporting the greater good. This also ensures simplicity and equity in cost allocation.

However, there may be some occasions that warrant breaking out select costs to promote goodwill among stakeholders. For example, Rutgers University breaks out Student Services into its own cost pool to recognize that research centers do not enroll students. Ultimately, executives must determine which situations require breaking out additional cost pools.

1. Costs Not Attributable to All Units
   - Units that do not generate certain overhead charges resist paying for those charges
   - Institutional approaches vary; choose breakout that best fits institution-specific model principles

2. Costs That Become More or Less Significant Over Time
   - Break out or pool costs as their overall materiality changes to better communicate year-over-year cost changes and maintain buy-in

The second potential instance to break out additional costs is if some costs become more significant over time. For instance, the University of Pennsylvania initially included Advancement within the General Overhead cost pool, but broke it out as a separate charge during a major campaign. Although deans could not control advancement costs, creating a separate pool communicated the reason behind general overhead cost increases. Similarly, Barnes University is considering establishing a materiality threshold upfront that will automatically break out costs that reach a certain level.

Provided that institutions remain close to the ideal four to six range, adding one or two cost pools for the sake of buy-in will not drastically weaken incentives.
Weighing the Advantages of Using Revenues or Expenditures as a Driver

Decision Point 6: Overhead cost allocation

Incorporate Remaining Costs into a Single Pool
Weighing the Advantages of Using Revenues or Expenditures as a Driver

After building out four to six cost pools, executives should incorporate the remaining costs into a general overhead pool for allocation. Common expenses pooled as general overhead are listed on the left. Broadly, general overhead costs are not easily tied to unit activity and are therefore outside of dean control.

Typical Expenses Pooled as General Overhead

- President’s Office
- General Counsel
- Budget and Finance
- Board of Trustees
- University Relations
- Compliance
- Risk Management

Relative Advantages of Two Common Drivers

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Type of Charge</th>
<th>Advantages</th>
<th>Disadvantages</th>
<th>Example</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Share of Overall Revenue</td>
<td>More stable</td>
<td>Risks dis-incentivizing revenue growth</td>
<td>UF</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Share of Overall Direct Expenditures</td>
<td>Promotes reduced cost consumption</td>
<td>More volatile; units likely to ask for exemptions</td>
<td>UF</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Institutions typically allocate general overhead in one of two ways—either by unit share of total revenue or by unit share of total direct expenditures. The table on the right lists the relative advantages and disadvantages of these two approaches. While unit revenues are typically more stable, allocating general overhead by share of revenue does not incent any behavior change. In comparison, allocating general overhead on expenditures provides further encouragement for units to reduce spending, but expenditures are more volatile year-to-year. In particular, an expenditure-based tax penalizes colleges and departments for large, one-time costs such as research equipment purchases. Though executives can grant exceptions for large purchases, this creates complexity and builds uncertainty into the cost model. For this reason, most institutions view a revenue-based general overhead tax as the safer option.

Source: University of Florida, Gainesville, FL; University of North Carolina, Chapel Hill, NC; Business Affairs Forum interviews and analysis.
Addressing Common Concerns

Tactics to Safeguard Deans from Volatility and Prevent Service Duplication

To further assist institutions in cost allocation methodology design, the table below summarizes proven change management tactics that address common academic unit concerns with cost allocation. For example, units may become more vocal about administrative unit performance after they perceive they are “paying” for those services, or may resist the interdependencies between colleges that cost allocation creates. Solutions to such challenges are detailed below.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Model Characteristic</th>
<th>Academic Unit Concern</th>
<th>Suggested Tactic</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Central Service Charges</td>
<td>“The charge for central HR is too high. I can have someone in-house do it cheaper.”</td>
<td>Encourage units to provide input into Service Level Agreements and annual service unit budgets</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>“My overhead cost charge spiked this year. I blame the growth of administrators.”</td>
<td>Provide unit leaders with line-item breakouts of cost pools that explain notable year-over-year variances</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Volatility of Overhead Expenses</td>
<td>“Overhead charges are volatile, so I can’t plan for my expense charges.”</td>
<td>Allocate particularly volatile expenses (e.g., utilities) or expenses with volatile drivers (e.g., direct expenditures, fundraising receipts) across 2-4 year rolling averages</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>“My cost charges are dependent on other colleges. I get charged more when another college cuts costs or loses enrollments.”</td>
<td>Set caps and floors on how much a unit’s share of a given expense can increase or decrease year-over-year</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Business Affairs Forum interviews and analysis.
How do we regulate unit spending to protect institution finances and strategic goals?

Decision Point in Brief

Importance to Budget Model
While all institutions seek to ensure academic units make smart spending decisions, regulating unit investments is even more important in activity-based models. Growth incentives encourage units to take risks, so central leadership must implement safeguards to ensure college investments are sustainable long-term and align with institutional priorities.

Observed Options
Most institutions regulate unit spending through a standard set of oversight mechanisms. For example, central administration vets new program proposals, the provost approves new faculty lines, and a curricular review committee monitors course offerings and quality.

EAB Guidance
Institutions should supplement standard oversight mechanisms with ongoing central resource planning to ensure unit alignment with institutional finances and strategic goals.
Ensuring Smarter Unit-Level Spending Decisions

Set of Proven Practices Address Majority of Concerns

Beyond allocating indirect costs, the final decision point in this section focuses on regulating unit-level spending or direct costs. While all institutions seek to ensure academic units make smart spending decisions, regulating unit investments is even more important in activity-based models. Growth incentives encourage units to take risks, so central leadership must implement safeguards to ensure college investments are sustainable long-term and align with institutional priorities.

Fortunately, institutions have already found proven solutions to the majority of concerns regarding unchecked unit spend. For example, a common concern with activity-based models is that colleges will launch unprofitable programs—but most institutions have a central committee that vets all program proposals to determine viability. Another worry is that colleges will hire too many faculty, creating inflexible, long-term salary costs. However, the provost typically approves all faculty hires, even at very decentralized institutions.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Common Concern</th>
<th>Proven Solution</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Colleges will launch unprofitable new programs</td>
<td>Central administration vets and approves all new program proposals</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Colleges will make unnecessary investments in new faculty or staff</td>
<td>Provost retains power to approve all new full-time faculty and staff hires</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Colleges will create low quality courses to poach students from other units</td>
<td>Curricular Review Committee or Faculty Senate monitors course quality</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Colleges will create duplicate courses to generate more revenue from their majors</td>
<td>Curricular Review Committee or Faculty Senate monitors course offerings for unwanted duplication</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Colleges will make investments that deviate from institution-level strategic vision</td>
<td>Provost authorizes or denies dean reappointments</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Business Affairs Forum interviews and analysis.
Decision Point 7: Monitoring unit spend

Taking a More Holistic Approach to Oversight

Case Western Quarterly Strategy Meetings Guide Unit Spending

Beyond this standard oversight playbook, Case Western Reserve University (CWRU) takes a more holistic approach to regulate direct costs as part of central planning. Each year, the CBO, provost, and several other central leaders meet with each dean and college business officer to collaboratively set unit goals—including finances, operations, strategy, and hiring. This group also reconvenes quarterly to discuss units’ progress on goals and plan next steps. The intent of these meetings is to ensure the viability of unit spending decisions as well as unit alignment with institutional strategy.

Representative CWRU Strategy Meeting

Although Case Western’s budget model is heavily decentralized, these strategy meetings enable leaders to maintain a strong centralized planning process. As an example outcome, central finance staff helped the College of Social Work negotiate a better deal with an external vendor to launch an online Master’s program. Without the involvement of central administration, the college likely would have created a less profitable program.

Source: Case Western Reserve University, Cleveland, OH; Business Affairs Forum interviews and analysis.

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Preserving Mission-Critical Activities Through Subvention and Strategic Reserves

• Decision Point 8: How do we ensure sufficient central reserves for strategic investments?
• Decision Point 9: How overt or hidden should subvention be?
• Decision Point 10: How do we motivate units receiving subvention to still make financial improvement?
Controlling the Impact of Allocation Incentives

Two Challenges Necessitate Central Reserves and Subvention

Incorporating decentralized elements into the budget model creates meaningful revenue and cost incentives, but can create two new challenges. First, allocating the majority of revenue to the academic units can leave central administration starved for resources. The cost allocation methodology ensures enough funding for day-to-day business operations, but activity-based models often leave the center without sufficient funds for large, strategic, or cross-campus investments. Second, making resource allocation contingent upon performance exposes units to enrollment declines or revenue shortfalls that could threaten operations.

To address these challenges, institutions must build well-resourced, centrally controlled strategic investment and subvention funds, but do so without undermining the financial incentives created by revenue and cost allocation. This section details three executive-level decision points for structuring subvention and strategic reserves in the budget model. These decisions points will help executives balance the decentralized financial incentives described in Section 1 of this publication with centralized elements that safeguard institution mission and brand. The first decision point offers guidance on ensuring sufficient central strategic reserves, while the latter two decision points address how to best structure subvention to safeguard units and maintain financial accountability.

Source: Business Affairs Forum interviews and analysis.
How do we ensure sufficient central reserves for strategic investments?

Decision Point in Brief

Importance to Budget Model
Ensuring the budget model provides some central funding for institutional priorities is critical to achieving strategic goals. Moreover, the structure used to secure and deploy strategic funds can impact stakeholder buy-in for the model.

Observed Options
Some institutions fail to create a dedicated mechanism to fund central reserves, which leaves central administration unable to fund cross-campus strategic investments. However, this was more common in decades past. Most institutions that have changed models in the last 5-10 years have created a separate tax on all revenue to ensure sufficient central reserves. Some institutions combine subvention and strategic reserves into one fund, while others establish distinct pools funded through separate taxes.

EAB Guidance
Institutions should create a separate 3-5% tax on all revenue to fund central strategic reserves, either set aside before allocations or collected from units after allocations. Institutions designing new budget models should establish this tax from the outset. Institutions introducing a new tax within an existing budget model should anticipate push-back from campus stakeholders. Proven tactics to secure campus buy-in for a strategic reserve tax include slowly increasing the tax percentage over several years to avoid disruptive change and promising to return a portion of funds to the units through strategic investments.
Decision Point 8: Ensuring central strategic reserves

‘The Limbs Thrive While the Body Dies’

Decentralized Budget Models May Leave the Center Without Sufficient Resources

The next executive-level decision point focuses on how to ensure central administration has sufficient resources for cross-campus strategic investments. The most cited challenge of RCM or similarly decentralized models is a lack of fungible resources available for central administration. The graphic below depicts one institution’s revenue allocation model in their its year under RCM, though this is representative of many institutions with decentralized models. Academic units receive 90% of tuition revenue through allocations, while 10% flows into a combined subvention and strategic fund. However, after capital projects and hold-harmless funding, less than $1M—just 0.3% of tuition revenue—remains for central strategic reserves. This problem is particularly difficult to solve after a model goes live, as allocations cannot be radically altered from one year to the next.

Representative Activity-Based Tuition Revenue Allocation Model
To ensure sufficient central strategic dollars, most institutions that have changed models in the last 5-10 years have created a separate strategic reserve tax on all revenue. Examples of institutions’ strategic tax percentage are shown below, separated by institutions that take funds off-the-top before unit allocations and those that tax on the back end after unit allocations. As discussed in Decision Point 1 (i.e., tuition revenue allocation percentage), both approaches have advantages for funding strategic reserves. Differences in tax and allocation structures across institutions with varying budget models makes determining a single benchmark almost impossible. That said, the ideal range for a strategic reserve tax appears to be between 3-5% of all revenue.

### Examples of Tax Rates to Fund Central Strategic Reserves

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Percentage Tax Before Allocation</th>
<th>Percentage Tax After Allocation</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1%</td>
<td>2%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3%</td>
<td>4%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Miami University, Oxford, OH; Ohio University, Athens, OH; Rutgers University, New Brunswick, NJ; Thompson Rivers University, Kamloops, BC; Washington University in St. Louis, St. Louis, MO; Business Affairs Forum interviews and analysis.
Options for Gaining Academic Leader Buy-In

While finding the right tax percentage is relatively straightforward, securing buy-in for a strategic reserve tax can be more complicated. Institutions designing new budget models can often create a strategic reserve tax from the outset with minimal pushback, since the larger-scale budget changes will occupy stakeholders’ attention. On the other hand, institutions introducing a tax within an existing budget model should expect stakeholder push back, as faculty and academic leaders will likely be wary of budget allocation changes. Two tactics to win stakeholder buy-in for a strategic reserve tax are detailed below.

First, some institutions gradually increase the central reserve tax over time to avoid disruptive change. For example, Washington University in St. Louis plans to increase its new tax half a percent each year until it reaches the desired 4%.

**Incrementing Up Tax Rate Over Several Years**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>FY12</th>
<th>FY19</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1.0%</td>
<td>2.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2.0%</td>
<td>3.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3.0%</td>
<td>4.0%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

- Provost Fund financed through tax on traditional undergraduate net tuition
- In FY14, tax generated $3M
- In FY19, tax will generate $9M

The second tactic to secure stakeholder buy-in for a strategic tax is to promise to return a portion of reserves back to the units. In particular, several institutions have created dedicated pools of funds to selectively invest in faculty projects with central dollars. Faculty at these institutions were less resistant to the introduction of the tax because they had the chance to win back an even larger share of funds. To ensure best use of resources, institutions should only earmark dollars for categories of projects that reinforce larger institutional priorities, such as a faculty equity fund or new academic program fund.

To learn more executive tactics for securing funding for central reserves and winning buy-in for strategic priorities, members can access our publication *Increasing Central Fungible Dollars on eab.com*.

Source: Miami University, Oxford, OH; Prairie View A&M University, Prairie View, TX; Washington University in St. Louis, St. Louis, MO; Business Affairs Forum interviews and analysis.
How overt or hidden should subvention be?

Decision Point in Brief

Importance to Budget Model
The subvention methodology impacts the transparency of the budget model, the amount of executive control over subvention allocations, and the level of criticism from campus stakeholders.

Observed Options
Institutions utilizing an overt subvention methodology directly tax units for subvention, and redistribute the funds to support units with deficits or mission-critical units unable to generate a profit. Alternatively, institutions attempt to hide or partially hide subvention to avoid political battles or build simplicity and fairness into the model. These institutions use a variety of methods to hide subvention, including weighted credit hours, cross-subsidies hidden within historical base-budgets, or cost allocation that favors some units over others.

EAB Guidance
Though logical in theory, hidden subvention often leads to negative outcomes—including perverse incentives, a lack of control over allocations, and increased stakeholder criticism. To avoid these problems, institutions should make subvention as overt as possible through an explicit unit tax. Both hidden and overt subvention will generate some criticism from stakeholders, but overt subvention maintains transparency in the budget model critical to creating unit-level financial accountability. Moreover, executives can minimize stakeholder pushback of an explicit subvention tax by proactively explaining the important role subvention plays in the advancement of institutional goals and mission.
The Appeal of Hidden Subvention

Institutions Hide Subvention to Allay Concerns and Automate Subsidies

The next two executive-level decision points focus on preserving mission-critical activities through subvention. Subvention is typically defined as any subsidy central administration provides to a unit in addition to its standard revenue allocation, including direct subsidies and hold-harmless funding. Institutions utilizing an overt subvention methodology directly tax units for subvention, and then redistribute the funds to support units in deficits or mission-critical units unable to generate a profit. Institutions that take a hidden approach to subvention deliberately distort the revenue allocation formula to covertly subsidize specific units. Three common types of hidden subvention are detailed below.

Examples of Hidden Subvention

**Historical Base Budgets**

The Ohio State University applies the revenue allocation formula only to new revenues, so units continue to receive historical base budgets with inherent cross-subsidies.

**Cost Allocation Formula**

One university charges the same tax rate for all types of space in order to subsidize research, which occurs in significantly more expensive spaces.

**Weighted Credit Hours**

University of New Hampshire reviews SCH weighting annually and makes adjustments every 2-3 years to ensure units are not disadvantaged.

Three Considerations Driving Hidden Subvention

1. **Avoid Political Battles**
   Leaders believe explicit subsidies create a hostile culture of winners and losers, undercutting support for units that are mission-critical but financially dependent.

2. **Simplify Transfer of Funds to Units**
   Funds flow directly to units through the allocation formula rather than adding another central calculation and allocation step.

3. **Recognize Differences in Cost of Instruction**
   Weighted credit hours reflect legitimate differences in cost of instruction, inability to raise differential tuition.

Generally, institutions choose hidden rather than overt subvention for three major reasons listed above. Most obviously, institutions use hidden subvention in an attempt to avoid political battles created when academic leaders can clearly see which units subsidize others. Second, institutions use hidden subvention to simplify the transfer of funds between units. Rather than adding another round of allocations, hidden subvention embeds subsidies into the initial allocation. Last, institutions choose hidden subvention to build fairness into the model by recognizing legitimate differences in costs of instruction.

Source: The Ohio State University, Columbus, OH; University of New Hampshire, Durham, NH; Business Affairs Forum interviews and analysis.
Though logical in theory, hidden subvention often leads to negative outcomes. As an example, Danton State University\(^1\) began weighting Engineering credit hours double in order to provide additional resources for high instructional costs. Unexpectedly, the Engineering college grew by 25% across the next five years, forcing the institution to use central reserves to cover the expensive hidden subsidy. Eventually, Danton State abandoned weighted credit hours in favor of an overt subvention tax.

Institutions deploying hidden subvention typically face three distinct problems.

- First, hidden subvention creates perverse incentives. Danton State, profiled above, inadvertently created an incentive for Engineering to grow, even though each new student was a net loss for the institution.
- Second, executives have little control over subsidies embedded within an allocation formula. Many institutions must adjust weighted credit hour formulas each year to ensure units receive the amount of subvention leaders intend.
- Last, institutions that hide subvention will still receive push-back from campus stakeholders. Instead of avoiding political battles as intended, most academic leaders will see through the ploy of hidden subvention, leading to more political battles and criticism of the lack of transparency.

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1) Pseudonym.

Source: Business Affairs Forum interviews and analysis.
Biting the Bullet

Overt Subvention Typically Funded Through an Explicit Tax

To avoid the perverse outcomes of hidden subvention, EAB encourages institutions to make subvention as overt as possible through an explicit unit tax. Unlike hidden subvention, overt subvention maintains transparency in the budget model critical to creating unit-level financial accountability. Three institutions’ subvention tax rates are shown below.

Admittedly, implementing an explicit subvention tax may be politically difficult, and executives should expect pushback from campus stakeholders. However, institutions that maintain transparency around subvention and address the tough conversations head on typically move past the political battles quicker than those that attempt to hide subvention. Moreover, executives that choose an open conversation about subvention can proactively explain its important role in advancing institutional goals and mission, allowing all parties to find common ground.

**Observed Tax Rates to Fund Subvention Pool**

- **Queen’s University**
  - 4.25% tax rate on operating revenue complemented with nearly equal funding from investment income, auxiliary contributions, etc.
  - Charging a higher tax for subvention would drive additional colleges into subvention

- **McMaster University**
  - 8% tax rate
  - University Fund supports both subvention and strategic initiatives

- **University of Pennsylvania**
  - 20% tax on tuition revenue and 10.5% tax on grant overhead
  - Approximately 75% of fund for subvention, 25% for strategic funds

Source: McMaster University, Hamilton, ON; Queen’s University, Kingston, ON; University of Pennsylvania, Philadelphia, PA; Business Affairs Forum interviews and analysis.
How do we motivate units receiving subvention to still make financial improvement?

Decision Point in Brief

Importance to Budget Model
Ensuring units are still motivated to improve unit P+L while receiving subvention is critical to maintain the financial accountability incentives created by the budget model.

Observed Options
Institutions provide two types of subvention to academic units. Bridge subvention is short-term financial support to help units avoid disruptive change. Though bridge subvention is typically provided to units when a new model goes live, institutions may offer bridge subvention any time a unit experiences temporary deficits. Many institutions motivate units on bridge subvention by slowly scaling back funds over time, commonly known as hold harmless. The second type of subvention is mission-critical subvention, long-term subsidization for unprofitable units critical to the university mission. Generally, most institutions provide long-term subvention funds “no questions asked,” without considering how to continually motivate units to improve. This leads to unit dependency of central funds and undercuts budget model incentives.

EAB Guidance
Institutions must first distinguish between two forms of subvention, as the strategies to motivate units differ by subvention type. To motivate units receiving bridge subvention, leaders must set a clear end date for subvention funds. For units on mission-critical subvention, central administration should place conditions on subvention funds and require spending plans to drive financial improvements.
Creating an Entitlement Culture

Units Become Dependent on Central Support at One University

The next decision point centers on counteracting the major risk associated with subvention—that subsidization will undermine the budget model incentives as units become dependent on central support. The example below depicts one institution’s experience with this problem. This institution transitioned budget models in 2007 and planned to wean units off subvention over several years.

Subvention Dependency at One Institution

1. New decentralized model goes live in 2007, leadership plans to wean units off subvention in a few years
2. In 2008, recession hits, and units experience severe financial strain
3. Leadership keeps subvention in place with understanding that once the institution reenters a growth mode, it will subside
4. Units become dependent on subvention
5. Even in 2016, with incentives undercut, units are hesitant to launch new programs for fear of losing subvention funds

"The units became completely reliant on the subvention funds, and we couldn’t take it away. It’s like reducing someone’s salary.”
CBO, Private Research University

"Making units whole with subvention when they should be in a deficit is the same thing as incremental budgeting.”
CBO, Canadian Research University

When the recession hit, leaders decided to maintain subvention levels until the institution reentered a more stable business environment. However, units quickly became dependent on subvention, and the guaranteed subsidy undermined incentives for growth. In fact, many units deliberately avoided new program launches fearing unit growth would lead to subvention reductions. Nine years after model implementation, subvention levels remain unchanged. Worse yet, leaders are unsure how to scale back subvention because units rely so heavily on subsidization to maintain their operations. To help institutions avoid this scenario, the next several pages detail strategies to preserve financial incentives while providing subvention where needed.

Source: Business Affairs Forum interviews and analysis.
The first critical step is to distinguish between two forms of subvention, as the strategies to motivate units differ by subvention type. The first type is bridge subvention, temporary resources for units that can achieve financial independence but require short-term support to restructure or adjust to significant change. The most common form of bridge subvention is hold-harmless funding provided when a new model goes live, though institutions may provide bridge subvention any time a unit experiences temporary declines. The second type of subvention is mission-critical subvention, long-term funding for unprofitable units important to institutional mission. Of course, institutions should not indefinitely support every unprofitable unit. Rather, leaders must distinguish between truly mission-critical units and those that can be restructured, downsized, or collapsed into other areas.

The above table shows which colleges leaders at Miami of Ohio determined would receive bridge and mission-critical subvention during their model transition. In most cases, it should be clear which units can eventually generate a profit and which will require ongoing support. Where there is less certainty, institutions should default to bridge subvention and readjust down the road if necessary.

The remainder of this decision point offers strategies for institutions to motivate units to improve P+L while providing each type of subvention.
Decision Point 10: Structuring effective subvention

Setting a Clear End Date

Phasing Out Subvention Acclimates Units, Spurs Change

The best tactic to motivate units on bridge subvention is to communicate a clear end date. Setting clear expectations for when subsidization will cease motivates units to prepare for financial independence. As shown on the left, many institutions also attenuate the amount of subvention each year to provide further motivation to improve. Leaders at Queen’s University scaled back the percentage of guaranteed funds each year to help units prepare for complete independence by year five of the budget model.

Variations of bridge subvention are listed on the right along with typical timeframes.

### Percentage of Guaranteed Pre-RCM Base Budget at Queen’s University

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year 1</th>
<th>Year 2</th>
<th>Year 3</th>
<th>Year 4</th>
<th>Year 5</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>90%</td>
<td>75%</td>
<td>55%</td>
<td>30%</td>
<td>0%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### Type of Hold Harmless and Typical Length

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Type of Hold Harmless</th>
<th>Capsule Description</th>
<th>Representative Institution</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Learning Year (1 year)</td>
<td>One-year data-sharing period to familiarize units with new allocation formula before changing budgets</td>
<td>University of Delaware</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Phased Implementation (4-5 years)</td>
<td>Increase amount of funds subject to formula in predetermined increments</td>
<td>University of Wisconsin</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Stop-Loss (4-5 years)</td>
<td>Set limit on how much funding individual units can lose in a single year</td>
<td>The University of New Mexico</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Queen’s University, Kingston, ON; University of Delaware, Newark, DE; “University of New Mexico—Main Campus Responsibility Center Management and Performance Based Budgeting,” available at http://www.unm.edu/~acadaffr/documents/unm-rcm-pbb-white-paper.pdf; University of Wisconsin, Madison, WI; Business Affairs Forum interviews and analysis.
Decision Point 10: Structuring effective subvention

Extending the Attenuating Hold Harmless Runway

McMaster Responds to Market Conditions and Preserves Growth Incentives

In recent tough budget climates, many institutions’ original subvention end date became unviable. Leaders facing financial challenges should lock in a fixed amount of subvention for several years to help units weather the storm while preserving growth incentives. Then, leaders can set a new end date for subvention.

The example below shows how McMaster University dealt with this situation. On the left, McMaster changed models in 2010 and planned to phase out hold-harmless by year five. However, when the institution encountered a period of stagnant growth, many units could not become financially independent as quickly as planned. McMaster first opted to extend subvention while scaling back funds in proportion to unit growth. Meaning, a unit that grew by $2 million would receive $2 million less in subvention. This provided no incentive to improve and undermined growth efforts.

In response, McMaster recalibrated the subvention plan shown on the right. Units received a fixed level of subvention for three years, which preserved the models’ growth incentives as they could still earn additional funding with increased activity. After three years, McMaster restarted the original attenuating subvention plan with a clear end date.

Source: McMaster University, Hamilton, ON; Business Affairs Forum interviews and analysis.
Decision Point 10: Structuring effective subvention

**Subvention with Strings Attached**

Incenting Some Incremental Growth in Financially Dependent Units

The second type of subvention is mission-critical subvention for financially dependent units that require long-term support. Common mission-critical loss-leaders are on the left. These units often lose money on paper, but offer less quantifiable contributions to institution mission, community engagement, or student recruitment. To motivate forward progress in these units, institutions should place stipulations on subvention funds. Unlike the typical “no-questions-asked” approach, subvention funds with strings attached give central administration some leverage to drive financial improvements.

**Common Mission-Critical “Loss Leaders”**

- College of Music
- College of Nursing
- College of Education
- College of Social Work

**For the Love of Subvention**

“Units love subvention because they can use the funds however they want—the center doesn’t have any leverage.”

*CBO, Private Research University*

**Mimicking the IMF**

“Providing subvention should be like the IMF giving a loan. We’re providing stability, but we also want to ensure units make some structural changes.”

*CBO, Canadian Research University*

Source: Business Affairs Forum interviews and analysis.
To motivate units receiving long-term subvention, Wilfrid Laurier University requires units to formally request subvention funds each year. Units submit proposals detailing either how they will increase their contribution to institutional mission or how they will reduce the amount of subvention needed next year. A group of senior leaders then evaluates proposals and determines funding for each unit. Of course, Wilfrid Laurier would never completely eliminate subvention for mission-critical units. However, subvention levels do fluctuate based on the review, so units are incented to make meaningful improvements.

For example, the annual justification process spurred the College of Music to launch a new revenue-generating conservatory for K-12 students. In addition to serving as an enrollment pipeline, the conservatory brings additional funds to the College and reduces the level of subvention central must provide.
Gallagher University\(^1\) Shifts Subvention Dollars into Strategic Fund

Notably, another institution was able to drive improvements in mission-critical units without creating a new review structure. Rather than attaching new conditions to subvention funds, leaders at Gallagher University simply combined the $50M subvention fund and $20M strategic fund into one $70M strategic pot. As with the old strategic fund, units must apply to the new strategic fund and leaders place conditions on fund use. Though units receive approximately the same amount of subvention as in the past, central administration now has more direct authority over how units use subvention funds.

Two Previously Separate Funds...  
Subvention Fund  
$50M

Strategic Fund  
$20M

...Combined into Single Fund to Give Central Greater Oversight

New Strategic Fund  
$70M

- Subvention funds allocated formulaically to keep units whole
- Strategic funds allocated to vetted initiatives that align with institution priorities
- Units apply for strategic funds, and leadership adds conditions on how funds are used

- Rather than putting new conditions on the subvention fund, university leaders at Gallagher University shifted subvention funds into the strategic fund
- Units will still receive the same approximate level of subvention as in the past, but now they must apply for funds and there is more central authority over how funds are used

1) Pseudonym.

Source: Business Affairs Forum interviews and analysis.
Incorporating Institutional Strategic Goals into the Model

• **Decision Point 11**: How do we incent student success goals through the budget model?
• **Decision Point 12**: How do we incent research growth through the budget model?
• **Decision Point 13**: How do we incent targeted new program launches through the budget model?
Rebalancing the Scales

Ensure Financial Accountability Does Not Distract from Central Priorities

The last category of decision points focuses on incorporating institutional priorities into the budget model. While creating meaningful revenue and cost incentives promotes financial accountability, it can also increase the risk of units becoming independent actors focused solely on P+L management. This could distract from campus-wide goals or even create counter incentives. For example, units may divest from research activities to grow SCH revenue or cancel low-registration sections of courses important to institutional completion goals.

To prevent this scenario, institutions must establish incentives and policies that reward progress on institutional strategic goals in addition to P+L objectives.

Sole Unit Focus on P+L Risks

Derailment of Long-Term Strategy

- Academic departments at one institution reacted to revenue incentives by cutting under-enrolled summer courses critical to student time-to-degree and completion goals.
- At another institution, funds allocated to academic units specifically for research faculty hires were instead used for discretionary needs.

Central Intervention Necessary to Focus Unit Effort on Campus Goals

- Centrally defined strategic goals position the institution for long-term financial success, but require unit-level focus and investment.
- Central incentives and policies align unit focus on P+L management with institution-wide priorities.

Source: Business Affairs Forum interviews and analysis.
Aligning Local Decisions with Central Strategy

Framework to Advance Strategic Goals Through College-Level Investments

Institutions can incorporate any strategic, campus-wide goal into the budget model using the following three-part framework. First, build unit-level incentives for units to advance the most important outcomes or metrics. Second, institutions should direct seed funding to initiatives that support strategic goals. These first two steps form a virtuous cycle, as units receive funds to make targeted changes and then are rewarded for improvement. Lastly, institutions must monitor and correct for unintended consequences or perverse incentives in the model.

To illustrate how to apply this framework, the last three decision points center on incorporating three common strategic goals into the budget model—advancing student success, growing research, and launching targeted new programs.
How do we incent student success goals through the budget model?

Decision Point in Brief

**Importance to Budget Model**
Without direct incentives or central policies, units and departments may undermine student success goals by concentrating solely on P+L accountability and SCH generation.

**Observed Options**
Most institutions focus on achieving student success goals outside of the budget model, though a handful of institutions have begun to utilize performance funding to reward student success goals.

**EAB Guidance**
If student success is a top strategic priority, institutions should use *budget model incentives and seed funding* to promote success goals, such as rewarding improved student retention and graduation rates with performance funds. Institutions should *monitor and correct for perverse budget model incentives* that may impede student success.
The first piece of the three-part framework for incenting student success in the budget model is incenting key metrics or outcomes. As an example, UC Riverside incorporates student success metrics into its tuition revenue allocation formula shown below. The first two parts of the formula represent the typical allocation by student credit hours and majors that reward instruction and enrollment. However, the remaining 20% of the formula rewards two student success metrics.

The first 10% of performance funding is tied to improvements in first-year retention rates from the previous year. Allocations are based on retention rate improvements rather than raw figures in order to create a level playing field—units with low rates can still earn meaningful dollars, and units with high rates are still motivated to improve further. The second 10% of performance funding rewards 4-year graduation rates, also based on units’ year-to-year improvement.

Source: University of California, Riverside, Riverside, CA; Business Affairs Forum interviews and analysis.
Similarly, the University of Kentucky also allocates performance funding to reward student success. Its $5M performance pot is split 75/25 to reward improvements in undergraduate and graduate student retention, respectively. To determine allocations, Kentucky calculates a per-student award rate and allocates funds to colleges for each additional student they retain compared to the previous year.

### Kentucky’s Performance Funding Award Allocation

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>College</th>
<th>YOY Increase in Students Retained</th>
<th>Award Rate Per Student</th>
<th>Total Award</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>A</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>$7.5K</td>
<td>$150k</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>B</td>
<td>250</td>
<td>$7.5K</td>
<td>$1.875M</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C</td>
<td>70</td>
<td>$7.5K</td>
<td>$525k</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>D</td>
<td>160</td>
<td>$7.5K</td>
<td>$1.2M</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Year One Results**

- **10/11**: Of UK’s undergraduate colleges improved retention, received funding awards
- **32.6%**: Percentage increase in number of students retained by College of Business and Economics, largest award recipient
- **One college focused on SCH production to “game” RCM revenue allocation, did not receive funding**

Although the $5M represents a small portion of Kentucky’s total budget, the results demonstrate the potential impact of even small financial incentives. In the first year, 10 of 11 undergraduate colleges at Kentucky increased retention rates and received funding awards. Interestingly, the one college that did not improve retention rates acknowledged it was too focused on adding electives and increasing SCH production to capture increased revenue, and plans to course correct next year.
University of Maryland System Seed Funding Facilitates Course Redesign

The second part of the framework is directing seed funding toward initiatives that support student success. As an example, the University of Maryland System (UMD) sought to improve student outcomes and reduce drop-fail-withdrawal (DFW) rates through course redesigns. To support this effort, UMD used strategic reserves to offer matching funds up to $20K for each redesign—which faculty used to flip classrooms, collapse course sections, and create active-learning modules. This incentive yielded significant long-term, sustainable improvements for UMD. The DFW rate declined by 7%, and 100% of course redesigns were sustained past the pilot phase. Moreover, the system achieved $1.8M in savings, mostly by collapsing course sections and freeing up costly adjunct dollars.

Administrators sought three key benefits from course redesigns:
- Decrease DFW rate of low completion courses
- Reduce long-term instructional costs
- Free up faculty time and adjunct funds for higher-return activities

---

This incentive yielded significant long-term, sustainable improvements for UMD. The DFW rate declined by 7%, and 100% of course redesigns were sustained past the pilot phase. Moreover, the system achieved $1.8M in savings, mostly by collapsing course sections and freeing up costly adjunct dollars.
Not Sacrificing Throughput for Efficiency’s Sake

UC Davis Intervenes to Safeguard Access to Critical Summer Courses

The last part of the framework is correcting for unintended consequences in the budget model. At UC Davis, units reacted to revenue incentives in the new budget model by eliminating low-enrollment summer courses to reduce costs. However, many of these summer courses were critical for student time-to-degree and completion goals. To counteract this perverse incentive, the Provost offered backfill funding to close the revenue gap between target and actual enrollments for 300 graduation-critical courses. This incents colleges to continue to offer important summer courses without fear of any becoming a net loss. More information on the Provost’s Instructional Need Funding is detailed below.

Institution places programmatic emphasis on summer courses to accelerate student time-to-degree

Budget model monitoring reveals departments are cutting under-enrolled summer courses to control costs

Provost incents college to offer graduation-critical summer courses with additional funds

**Provost Instructional Needs Funding**

- Time-to-degree critical courses guaranteed revenue allocation based on course enrollment targets, regardless of actual enrollments
- 300 out of 700 summer courses deemed critical and eligible for backfill funding
- Eligible courses include:
  - 100-level courses that are prerequisites for staying on-track in major
  - 100-level courses required of a large number of students
  - Upper division writing courses required of a large number of students

Source: University of California, Davis, Davis, CA; Business Affairs Forum interviews and analysis.
UC Riverside Integrates KPI Monitoring into Annual Budget Process

UC Riverside continuously monitors for any unintended consequences of the budget model that may undermine student success goals. To prevent units from sacrificing academic quality in pursuit of revenue gains, deans at Riverside complete an annual budget template that includes several student success key performance indicators (KPIs) including average class size, student-to-advisor ratios, and first-year retention rates. If a unit demonstrates a three-year negative trend in any KPI, the provost intervenes and works with the dean to diagnose the problem and course correct.

Units Complete Standard Budget Template
- Units submit annual budget templates with P+L data
- Templates force units to report key performance indicators of central interest

Reported Student Success KPIs
- Average class sizes
- % of classes taught by adjuncts
- Number of faculty course releases
- Student:advisor ratio
- First-year retention rate
- 4- and 6-year graduation rates

Center Monitors KPIs for Unintended Consequences
- Center tracks KPI data by college for inverse relationships that indicate units are sacrificing quality for revenue gains
- Provost intervenes and course corrects as necessary, reviewing 3-year KPI trends

“We want to make it clear that student success is a priority for UCR. We track it and built it into our revenue allocation model.”

Maria Anguiano, CBO
University of California, Riverside

Source: University of California, Riverside, Riverside, CA; Business Affairs Forum interviews and analysis.
Decision Point in Brief

Importance to Budget Model
Without direct incentives or central oversight, units and departments focused solely on P+L accountability may devalue or even divest from research goals in favor of more profitable activities.

Observed Options
Most institutions seeking to grow the research enterprise already allocate the majority of indirect cost recovery (ICR) to the originating college or to the VP of Research. Some institutions are beginning to experiment with performance funds to reward research growth.

EAB Guidance
If research growth is a top strategic priority, institutions should use budget model incentives and seed funding to encourage units to achieve research goals, such as allocations based on grant funding. Institutions should also monitor and correct for perverse budget model incentives that may impede research growth.
Activity-Based Models Can Divert Attention and Funding from Research Goals

The next decision point centers on incenting research growth through the budget model. As shown in the examples on the left, growing research is a top priority for many institutions. However, because research is typically a net expense, units and departments focused on P+L accountability may devalue research goals or even divest from some research in favor of more profitable activities. To counteract these pressures, this decision point applies the three-part framework to help institutions incorporate research growth into the budget model.

**Big Bets Abound...**

- **The University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill**
  Aims to double research expenditures and become top-5 public research university across next decade

- **FIU (Florida International University)**
  Seeks to increase research expenditures by 54% and become an R1 by 2020

- **UT Dallas**
  Plans to double tenure-track faculty ranks and more than double research expenditures by 2022

**...But Activity-Based Models Challenge Research Growth Goals**

1. **Distracting Incentives**
   - Activity-based models reward tuition growth and cost cutting over low-ROI research investments
   - Indirect cost recovery from grants is typically insufficient to cover all research costs

2. **Perverse Incentives**
   - Transparent models demonstrate that research is a cost driver and incent units to slow cost growth
   - Units may divest from research activities in order to free up resources for more lucrative initiatives

“Activity-based budget models are set up to reward butts in seats, not research. How do you make an activity-based model work in a research university?”

**CBO, Private Research University**

Decision Point 12: Incenting research growth

**Rewarding Research Outputs**

Queen’s Redistributes 1% of Revenues Based on Share of Grant Funding

The first part of the framework is incenting key research outcomes. Most institutions seeking to grow research already allocate the majority of indirect cost recovery (ICR) to the originating college or to the VP of Research. For more detailed information about allocating ICR, see *Optimizing Institutional Budget Models* available at eab.com. Beyond that standard practice, some institutions have implemented more innovative incentives to encourage research growth.

**Illustrative Example of Queen’s University’s Research Funding Model**

![Diagram showing the calculation of Queen’s University’s research funding model]

The first example is Queen’s University, who created a separate research funding pool with a 1% tax on unit revenue. Queen’s rewards research output by reallocating those funds back to the units based on their share of grant funding. Leaders at Queen’s deliberately chose an explicit research tax after budget allocations to motivate units to grow research grants and to distinguish research as a top institutional priority.

Source: Queen’s University, Kingston, ON; Business Affairs Forum interviews and analysis.
Incentivizing Momentous Research Growth

Performance Funds Reward Year-Over-Year Research Gains

Rather than creating a separate funding pool through a tax, a few institutions are incorporating research incentives into the tuition revenue allocation formula to reward research. While Queen’s incents total research activity, the institution below is specifically incenting new research growth. This model allocates 20% of tuition revenue to a performance pot, with 5% rewarding gains in research. Two potential metrics to reward unit research gains through performance funding are detailed at the bottom.

Representative Tuition Revenue Allocation Formula

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>SCH Majors</th>
<th>Performance-Based Funding Pot</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>60%</td>
<td>20%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

5% of funding rewards research growth

Two Potential Metrics for Assessing and Rewarding Unit Research Gains

Research Expenditure Growth Rate Targets

Units receive performance-based funds for meeting or exceeding centrally set target growth rates

Proportionate Share of Institutional Research Growth

Units receive performance funding awards for their contribution to overall research expenditure growth relative to other units

Source: University of North Carolina, Chapel Hill, NC; Business Affairs Forum interviews and analysis.
Decision Point 12: Incenting research growth

Seeding Interdisciplinary Research Growth

Riverside Uses Central Funding to Incent Cluster Hiring in Strategic Areas

The second part of the framework is using central seed funding to fuel interdisciplinary research growth. For example, UC Riverside uses strategic funds for research faculty cluster hires across six research themes, such as Energy Efficiency and Sustainable Development. Departments must submit proposals for cross-disciplinary faculty positions, and the Provost will fund the new faculty lines as well as additional start-up costs through the strategic investment fund.

UC Riverside’s Process for Growing Interdisciplinary Research Faculty

1 Identify Strategic Research Areas
   Strategic Action Plan calls for programmatic cluster hiring in 33 areas across 6 overarching research themes by 2020

2 Vet New Faculty Proposals for Impact and Strategic Alignment
   • Departments prepare cross-disciplinary proposals for new faculty positions
   • Rigorous peer review process vets proposals for grant potential and strategic alignment

3 Award Seed Funding to Promising Proposals
   Provost considers peer review reports, funds new faculty lines and other start-up hiring expenses

Sample Strategic Research Themes

• Science, cultivation, and production of plants and food
• Next generation technologies: new materials, phenomena, and devices
• Energy efficiency and sustainable development

140 Faculty positions to be funded through Strategic Investment Fund

$110M Additional start-up funding available for faculty recruitment and hiring

81 Interdisciplinary faculty positions currently in recruitment based on approved proposals

Source: University of California, Riverside, Riverside, CA; Business Affairs Forum interviews and analysis.
Decision Point 12: Incenting research growth

Correcting Perverse Incentives in Faculty Hiring

SUNY Buffalo Takes Back Central Control of Earmarked Funds

The third part of the framework is correcting unintended consequences created by the budget model that may impede research growth. In the example below, SUNY Buffalo opted to allocate new tuition revenue from enrollment growth and state-approved tuition increases to the units specifically for research faculty hires. However, because senior leaders did not include an enforcement mechanism, many units utilized funds for discretionary needs rather than investing in new faculty.

In response, leaders at SUNY Buffalo adjusted the model to regain some central authority over use of new tuition revenue. As shown above, 50% of new revenue flows to the academic units, but only after they create spending plans demonstrating their intentions to invest in new faculty hires. The remaining 50% flows into the Provost’s Strategic Investment Fund for strategic initiatives.

Source: The State University of New York at Buffalo, Buffalo, NY; Business Affairs Forum interviews and analysis.
Decision Point in Brief

**Importance to Budget Model**
Without central intervention, units and departments focused on P+L management lack an incentive to launch mission-critical programs with low short-term revenue potential.

**Observed Options**
The most common approach to incenting new program launches is to reserve a portion of central strategic funds to seed targeted programs that advance key priorities. Some institutions build direct incentives into the budget model to encourage targeted program growth.

**EAB Guidance**
Institutions can use *direct seed funding and budget model incentives such as targeted revenue-sharing agreements to spur investment in strategically important programs.* Institutions should *monitor and correct for perverse budget model incentives that may impede new program launches.*
A Necessary Intervention

Encouraging Units to Look Beyond Profits to Long-Range Strategic Niches

The last decision point focuses on creating budget model incentives for units to launch targeted new programs. As shown below, there are four main reasons that institutions launch new programs. First and most obviously, new programs generate additional revenue, so deans will naturally explore these opportunities. Second, institutions create programs in high-demand fields to respond to local needs or serve the larger community. Third, institutions may launch a program to target new student segments such as online or adult learners with the goal of creating more segment-specific programs later. Lastly, institutions may launch new programs to enhance their market competitiveness.

Four Reasons Institutions Launch New Programs

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Reason</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Grow Revenues</td>
<td>Lucrative graduate and non-degree programs create profits that help offset the costs of programs with structural deficits</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Respond to Local Needs</td>
<td>Programs in high-need fields advance institutional mission to serve state and local communities</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Target New Student Segments</td>
<td>Programs targeted at online, off-site, or non-traditional learners offset demographic changes that limit the growth of traditional student enrollments</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Enhance Market Competitiveness</td>
<td>High-demand programs attract students in target market and hedge against competition</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

While these goals are not necessarily mutually exclusive, new programs centered on reasons two through four do not always yield a positive ROI, at least not in the short term. Even if these programs align with institutional priorities, units lack an incentive to launch programs with low-revenue potential. Therefore, central intervention is often necessary to spur unit investment in strategically important programs.
Expanding Beyond the Borders

GW Uses Revenue Incentives to Spur New Off-Site and Online Programs

The first type of central intervention is to build direct incentives into the budget model to encourage targeted program growth. For example, George Washington University utilizes budget model incentives to promote new programs for particular types of students. In addition to its space-constrained urban location, GW faces a city-mandated cap on its enrollment within Washington, DC. This has led GW to pursue two alternative forms of growth—creating online programs and off-site programs at its Virginia campuses.

To incent focus on these alternative programs, GW tweaked the budget model allocations so units retain a higher portion of revenue for off-site and online programs. While the allocation for on-campus programs is 70% of revenue, units receive 80% of revenue for off-site programs and 85% for online programs. Though the model is still new, early enrollment projections indicate that it has successfully incented units to focus on alternative program growth.

"The model was built in collaboration with the Provost, Deans, and central administration. We built incentives into the methodology to increase the autonomy of the schools, giving them more control of their own destinies."

Ann McCorvey
Deputy EVP and Treasurer, GW
Decision Point 13: Incenting targeted program launches

Cultivating Strategic Growth

Reserving a Portion of Central Fund for Targeted Initiatives

The most common approach to incenting new program launches is to reserve a portion of central strategic funds to seed targeted programs that advance key priorities. For additional resources on evaluating and vetting new program launches, including sample business case templates, please see *Increasing Central Fungible Dollars* available at eab.com.

### Example Strategic Reserve Fund

- Institutions reserve portion of strategic pot to fund strategically important new programs
- Articulation agreements with 2-year colleges
- New programs for non-traditional learners
- Tech transfers and other endeavors that spur local economic growth
- New programs in high-demand fields

Majority of pot funds diverse set of initiatives chosen through at-large proposal process

Source: Business Affairs Forum interviews and analysis.
Advisors to Our Work
The Business Affairs Forum is grateful to the individuals and organizations that shared their insights, analysis, and time with us. We would especially like to recognize the following individuals for being particularly generous with their time and expertise.

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**Roger Demareski**  
Lafayette College  
Vice President, Finance & Administration

**Mike Hales**  
Northern Kentucky University  
Chief Financial Officer
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Institution</th>
<th>Position</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Barbara Moses</strong></td>
<td>North Carolina State University</td>
<td>University Budget Director</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Stephen Golding</strong></td>
<td>Ohio University</td>
<td>Vice President, Finance &amp; Administration, Chief Financial Officer, Treasurer</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Rebecca Vazquez-Skillings</strong></td>
<td>Otterbein University</td>
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<td><strong>Melissa Johnson</strong></td>
<td>Purdue University</td>
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<td>Queen’s University</td>
<td>Vice Principal, Finance &amp; Administration</td>
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<td><strong>Alan Harrison</strong></td>
<td>Queen’s University</td>
<td>Provost, Vice Principal</td>
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<td><strong>Megan Sheppard</strong></td>
<td>Queen’s University</td>
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<td>Rutgers University</td>
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<td>Associate Vice President, Finance</td>
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<td><strong>Gord Meyers</strong></td>
<td>Simon Fraser University</td>
<td>Associate Vice-President, Academic</td>
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<td><strong>Michael Holbeck</strong></td>
<td>South Dakota State University</td>
<td>Assistant Director, Finance &amp; Budget</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Jackie Nelson</strong></td>
<td>South Dakota State University</td>
<td>Director, Budget and Grants &amp; Contracts Administration</td>
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<td><strong>Wesley Tschetter</strong></td>
<td>South Dakota State University</td>
<td>Associate Vice President, Finance &amp; Business</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Laura Hubbard</strong></td>
<td>State University of New York at Buffalo</td>
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<td><strong>Gwenn Judge</strong></td>
<td>Syracuse University</td>
<td>Director, Budget &amp; Planning</td>
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<td><strong>Louis Marcoccia</strong></td>
<td>Syracuse University</td>
<td>Executive Vice President, Chief Financial Officer</td>
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<td><strong>Lynsay Belshe</strong></td>
<td>The George Washington University</td>
<td>Senior Advisor to Executive Vice President &amp; Treasurer</td>
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<td><strong>Lou Katz</strong></td>
<td>The George Washington University</td>
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<td><strong>Antoinette McCorvey</strong></td>
<td>The George Washington University</td>
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<td><strong>Kristine Devine</strong></td>
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<td><strong>Scott Klute</strong></td>
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<td>University of Alabama</td>
<td>at Birmingham, Vice President, Financial Affairs &amp; Administration</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Andy Hollis</strong></td>
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<td>at Birmingham, Director, Business Systems Analysis &amp; Special Projects</td>
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<td><strong>Gregg Goldman</strong></td>
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<td>Senior Vice President, Business Affairs, Chief Financial Officer</td>
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<td><strong>Louise Davidson</strong></td>
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<td>Director of Strategic Planning</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Marcia Steinfield</strong></td>
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<td>Financial Analyst</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Kelly Ratliff</strong></td>
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<td>Senior Associate Vice Chancellor, Finance &amp; Resource Management</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Rebecca Lee-Garcia</strong></td>
<td>University of California, Los Angeles</td>
<td>Interim Director, Program Analysis</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Maria Anguiano</strong></td>
<td>University of California, Riverside</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Alan Brangman</strong></td>
<td>University of Delaware</td>
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</tbody>
</table>
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Chief Budget Officer

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University of Delaware
Director, Planning & Operations

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